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Summary findings
Vietnam's  accession  to the ASEAN Free  Trade  Area  AFTA, APEC,  and  unilateral  liberalizations  affect
(AFTA) has been  an important  step  in its integrati9n  into  Viietnam's  industries  in different  ways.  AFTA appears  to
the world  economy.  Fukase  and Martin  use a  ben.efit Vietnam's  agriculture  by improving  its access to
multiregion,  multisector  computable  general  equilibrium  the ASEAN market.
model  to evaluate  how  different  trade  liberalizaticn  '  Broad  unilateral  liberalization  beyond  AFTA is likely
policies  of Vietnam  and  its main  trading  partners  affect  to shift  labor  away from  agriculture  and  certain  import-
Vietnam's  welfare,  taking  into  account  the  simultaneous  competing  activities  toward  relatively  labor-intensive
impacts  on trade,  output,  and  industrial  structure.  manufacturing.  Reduced  costs for  intermediate  inputs
They  conclude  that:  will benefit  domestic  production.  'fhese  sectors  conform
- The static  economywide  effects  of the AFTA  to  Vietnam's  current  comparative  advantage,  and
liberalization  to which  Vietnam  is currently  committed  undertaking  broad  unilateral  liberalization  now  seems  a
are  small.  On  the import  side,  the exclusion  of a series  of  promising  way to  facilitate  the  subsequent  development
products  from  the AFTA  commitments  appears  to limit  of competitive  firms in more  capital-  and skill-intensive
the  scope  of trade  creation,  and  the  discriminatory  sectors.  By contrast,  more  intense  import  competition
nature  of AFTA liberalization  would  divert  Vietnam's  may  lead some  import  substitution  industries  (now
trade  from  non-ASEAN  members.  dependent  on  protection)  to contract.
- Vietnam's  small initial  exports  to ASEAN make  the  "  The  higher  level  of welfare  resulting  from  mnore
gains from  improved  access to partner  markets  relatively  cornprehensive  liberalization  implies  that  the  sectoral
modest.  Since Singapore  dominates  Vietnam's  ASEAN  protection  currently  given to  capital-intensive  and
exports  and  initial  protection  in Singapore  is close  to  strategic  industries  is imposing  substantial  implicit  taxes
zero,  there  are few  gains from  preferred  status  in this  on the  rest of the economy.
market.  *  All the  above  suggests  that  AFTA should  be treated
F  When  Vietnam  extends  its AFTA commitmen.s  to  as an  important  initial  step  toward  broader  liberalization.
all of its trading  partners  on a most  favored  nation  basis,  Binding  international  commitments  in AFTA and,  in due
its welfare  increases  substantially  -partly  because  of the  coiarse,  at the  World  Trade  Organization  can provide  a
greater  extent  of liberalization,  partly  because  the  credible  signal  of Vietnam's  commitment  to open  trade
broader  liberalization  undoes  the  costly  trade  diversion  policies  that  will help  stimulate  the upgrading  of existing
created  by the initial  discriminatory  liberalization,  and  firms  and  investment  in efficient  and dynamic  firms.
finally  because  of the  more  efficient  allocation  of
resources  among  Vietnam's  industries.
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Vietnam's accession to ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) has been an important step in
its  integration  into  the  world  economy.  Fukase  and  Martin  use  a  multiregional,
multisector computable general equilibrium (CGE) model to evaluate how different trade
liberalization policies by Vietnam and its main trading partners affect Vietnam's welfare,
taking into account the simultaneous impacts on trade, output, and industrial structure.
They conclude that:
*  The static economywide effects of AFTA liberalization to which Vietnam is currently
committed are small.  On the import side, the exclusion of a series of products from
the  AFTA  commitments  appears to  limit  the  scope  of  trade  creation,  and  the
discriminatory nature of AFTA liberalization would divert Vietnam's trade from non-
ASEAN members.
*  Vietnam's small initial exports to ASEAN make the gains from improved access to
partner markets relatively modest.  Since Singapore dominates Vietnam's  ASEAN
exports and initial protection in Singapore is close to zero, there are few gains from
preferred status in this market.
*  When Vietnam extends its  AFTA commitments to all of its trading partners on a
most-favored-nation (MFN) basis, its welfare increases substantially-partly  because
of  the greater extent  of liberalization, partly because the broader liberalization
undoes the costly trade diversion created by the initial discriminatory liberalization,
and finally because of the more efficient allocation of resources among Vietnam's
industries.
*  AFTA, APEC, and unilateral liberalizations affect Vietnam's  industries in different
ways.  AFTA appears to benefit Vietnam's  agriculture by giving it better access to
ASEAN market.
*  Broader unilateral liberalization beyond AFTA is likely to shift labor from agriculture
and  certain  import  competing  activities  toward  relatively  labor-intensive
manufacturing.  Reduced  costs  for  intermediate  inputs  will  benefit  domestic
production.  These sectors conform to Vietnam's current comparative advantage and
taking this step now seems a promising way to facilitate the subsequent development
of competitive firns  in more capital and skill intensive sectors.  By contrast, more
intense  import  competition  may  lead  some  import  substitution  industries  (now
dependent on protection) to contract.
*  The higher level of welfare resulting from more comprehensive liberalization implies
that the sectoral protection currently given to capital-intensive and strategic industries
is costing Vietnam's economy as a whole, imposing substantial implicit taxes on the
rest of the economy.*  All of above suggest that AFTA should be treated as the important initial step towards
broader liberalization. Binding international commitments in AFTA and, in due
course, at the WTO, can provide a credible signal of Vietnam's commitment to open
trade policies that will help stimulate upgrading of existing firms and investment in
efficient and dynamic firms.
iiA Quantitative Evaluation of Vietnam's Accession to
the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA)
I. Introduction
Since its implementation of doi moi (renovation) in  1986,  Vietnam achieved
substantial progress in macroeconomic managements and opening up unilaterally its trade
and  investment policies.  .Vietnam's  recent  accession  to  ASEAN,  APEC,  and  the
accession process  to  WTO  offer  substantial  opportunities  to  liberalize  further  its
economic system.  Whereas the integration into international trading system is clearly
beneficial for Vietnam's  economic development, the effects of liberalization on certain
domestic industries remain a critical issue among Vietnamese policy makers. Information
on the consequences of further liberalization is clearly needed as a basis for decisions on
deepening the current reforms.
Important insights into the implications of liberalization can be obtained using
relatively  straightforward  analytical tools  based  on  theory  and  the  available  data.
However, a comprehensive evaluation of the implications for trade, industrial structure
and output requires a more sophisticated analytical framework. In this paper, we begin by
examining some of the key features of the Vietnamese economy and its trade regime. We
then use a multi-region and multi-sector Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model
to  evaluate the impacts of alternative policies by both  Vietnam and  its main trading
partners.
Inevitably, the implications of reforms such as AFTA membership and further
liberalization will depend upon the structure of Vietnam's economy and the nature of its
economic links with its AFTA partners. Section II therefore examines Vietnam's positionin ASEAN including its size of economy and factor endowments.  Direction of trade,
composition of trade with ASEAN and non-ASEAN countries, and revealed comparative
advantage (RCA) measures for the ASEAN 10 are also examined.  Section m  reviews
Vietnam's current trade regime including its tariff and non-tariff measures.  Section IV
presents  the  nature  of  AFTA  and  Vietnam's  liberalization  strategy.  Section  V.
demonstrates  the  modeling  approach  and  experiments  analyzing  Vietnam's  AFTA
commitments  and  some  alternative  scenarios.  Section  VI  presents  some  brief
conclusions.
II. Vietnam's Position in ASEAN
11.1.  Vietnam's Size of Economy, Openness, and Factor Endowments
Table  1 presents some key economic indicators for the ASEAN countries.
Table 1. Key Economic Indicators of ASEAN 10 countries
GDP 1996  Average  GDP  Population  hnports  Exports  Openness  ATable  Land  Gross
Annual  Per  1996  1996  Index  1994-1996  Enrollment
Growth  Capita  Ratio of
Rate  Secondary
1990-96  Education
(S mil.)  (%)  ($)  ($  ml.)  (  mil.)  ($ mil.)  (%)  (hectares  (%)
per capita)
Indonesia  225828  7.7  1146  197  42925  49727  41  0.09  48
Cambodia  3125  6.5  313  10  1647  300  62.3  0.39  27
Lao PDR  1857  6.7  371  5  642  334  52.6  0.19  25
Malaysia  99213  8.7  4724  21  76082  78151  155.5  0.09  61
Myanmar  na  5.7  na  46  2524  1187  na  0.21  32
Philippines  83840  6.8  1164  72  34663  20328  65.6  0.08  79
Singapore  94063  8.7  31354  3  131083  124794  272  0.00  84
Thailand  185048  8.3  3084  60  73289  55789  69.8  0.29  55
Vietnam  23340  8.5  311  75  13910  7016  89.7  0.08  47
Total  716309  489  376765  337626
Source:  World  Bank,  World  Development.Indicators  1998a
2ASEAN is a diverse group with a combined GDP of  $716 billion and 489 million
people.'  With its  75 million people, Vietnamn  is the  second most  populous member
country after Indonesia.  However, given its low-income level per capita, its shares of
GDP and trade in ASEAN remain relatively small, accounting for 3.3 percent and 2.9
percent respectively.
Vietnam was one of the fastest growing economies during the period 1990 to
1996, registering an  annual average growth rate of 8.5 percent. In 1996, imports plus
exports relative to GDP had reached 89.7 percent of GDP, a relatively high figure for a
populous country. Although Vietnam's economy is predominantly agricultural, Vietnam's
arable land per capita is relatively low accounting for 0.08 hectares per capita. Vietnam is
accumulating human capital relatively quickly through its secondary school enrollment
rate of 47 percent.
11.2.  Direction of Trade
Figure  1 and  figure 2  present Vietnam's  imports  by  source  and  exports  by
destination (General Statistical Office, 1997).
Figure  1 shows that 27 percent of Vietnam's imports were sourced from ASEAN
in 1996. Singapore was the leading supplier, accounting for 19 percent of Vietnam's total
imports followed by Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, the Lao PDR and
Cambodia. Figure 1 also highlights the importance of the other APEC countries as
Its member  countries  belong  to different  stages  of development.  Singapore  belonged  to the 'high income'
group  with  GDP  per capita  of $31,354  in 1996. Malaysia  was  classified  in the 'upper  middle  income'
group  with  per capita  income  of $4,724  whereas  Thailand,  the Philippines,  Indonesia  belonged  to the
'lower  middle  income' with  per capita  incomes  of $3,084,  $, 1,164  and $1,146  respectively.  Along
with  the other  new member  countries,  Cambodia,  Myanmar,  the Lao PDR,  Vietnam  was classified  as a
'low  income'  country  with  per capita  income  of $311  (World  Bank,  1998a).
3Figure 1. The Sources of Vietnam's  rnports in 1996
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sources of Vietnam's imports. In particular, imports from the other Asian countries,
Korea (17 percent), Taiwan (11 percent), and Japan (1 1 percent) were significant,
whereas imports from the United States were relatively small at 2 percent. APEC
countries altogether represent 80 percent of Vietnam's imports (GTAP 4 database). 2
Besides APEC countries, 14 percent of Vietnam's imports were sourced from the
European Union.
2 The members of APEC are Australia; Bnmei Darussalam; Canada; Chile; China; Hong Kong, China;
Indonesia; Japan, Republic of Korea; Malaysia; Mexico; New Zealand; Papua New Guinea; Republic
of the Philippines; Singapore; Taiwan, China; Thailand; and the United States of America. Peru,
Russia and Vietnam joined in November 1998.
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Source: General  Statistical  Office,  Statistical Yearbook 1997
Figure 2 implies that 24 percent of Vietnam's  exports were shipped to ASEAN
countries.  Singapore took 18 percent of Vietnam's exports followed by the Philippines,
Thailand, Camnbodia,  Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Lao PDR.  Vietnam's  exports to the
APEC countries are important accounting for 74 percent of Vietnam's  exports.  Japan
alone received 22 percent of Vietnam's exports in 1996. Besides the APEC countries, the
European countries were important destinations representing  16 percent of Vietnam's
exports.
Table 2 presents Vietnam's imports and exports with ASEAN member countries
for the years 1994-1996. Vietnam's imports from and exports to ASEAN increased by 77
percent and 99 percent respectively, primarily through increased trade with Singapore.
During the same period the share of ASEAN remained relatively steady because of rapid
growth in trade with other countries.
5Table 2. Vietnam's Imports and Exports from and to ASEAN 1994-1996.
IMPORTS  EXPORTS
1994  1995  1996  1994  1995  1996
Cambodia  18  24  18  77  95  99
Indonesia  116  190  149  35  54  46
Lao PDR  103  84  68  21  21  25
Malaysia  66  191  200  65  111  78
Philippines  15  25  29  4  42  132
Singapore  1146  1425  2033  594  690  1290
Thailand  226  440  495  98  101  107
Total ASEAN Trade  1690  2378  2991  893  1112  1777
Total Trade  5826  8155  11144  4054  5449  7256
ASEAN Share  %  29.0  29.2  26.8  22.0  20.4  24.4
In millions of U.S.dollars.
Source: General Statistical Office, Statistical Yearbook 1997
11.3.  The Composition of Trade: ASEAN vs. Non-ASEAN
Figure 3 and Figure 4 show the composition of Vietnam's  imports and exports
from and to ASEAN and non-ASEAN countries.
Figure  3  suggests that  Vietnam's  leading  imports  consist  of  electronics and
machinery equipment (MCE) followed by chemical and rubber products (CRP), and basic
manufacturing (BMF). A large percentage of Vietnam's imports in these categories are
likely to be intermediate inputs and capital goods. The leading imports from ASEAN are
3 The model database was aggregated from the original 50 sectors to thirteen sectors designed to provide a
reasonable representation of Vietnam's tradte  patterns: agriculture and forestry (AGR), basic manufacturing
(BMF), beverages and tobacco products (BTP), clothing (CLO), chemical, rubber, plastic products (CRP),
coal, oil, gas (COG), light manufacturing (LMF), electronics and machinery (MCE), processed agricultural
commnodities  (PAG), petroleum and coal products (PCP), textiles (TEX), transport equipment (TRP), and
others  (OTH). Likewise, we combine the  45 Global  Trade  Analysis Project  (GTAP) regions  into  12
aggregates: Indonesia (IDN), Malaysia (MYS), the Philippines (PHL), Singapore (SGP), Thailand (THA),
Vietnam  (VNM),  Japan  (JPN),  the  United  State  (USA),  EU15  (EU15),  Asian  Newly  Industrialized
countries excluding Singapore (NIES), China (CHN), and the rest of the world (ROW). Annex  4 presents
the description of the aggregation.
6chemical and rubber products (CRP), mainly fertilizer, resins & plastic materials from
Singapore and  Indonesia.  Singapore supplies about  78 percent  of  Vietnam  refined
petroleum imports (PCP).
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7Figure 4 demonstrates a sharp difference in the composition of exports between
ASEAN and non-ASEAN countries.  Three categories alone, agriculture and forestry
(AGR), processed agricultural commodities (PAG) and coal, oil and gas (COL), dominate
Vietnam's exports to ASEAN whereas exports of  these commodities are also significant
for non-ASEAN destinations. In contrast, textiles (TEX), Clothing  (CLO), and light
manufacturing (LMF) are shipped mainly to non-ASEAN countries.
Revealed Comparative Advantage (RCA)  for  the ASEAN  10
The Revealed Comparative Advantage (RCA) can be  a useful indicator of the
comparative advantage of countries (Balassa, 1965). Annex 1 presents RCAs for the 10
ASEAN countries. Following Balassa, 'Revealed'  Comparative Advantage is defined as
the share of a product group in one country's exports divided by that product group's
share in world trade.
RCAy=  =x,1x.)/fxy/x.),
where xyj  is country i's export of commodityj;
xwj  is world's exports of commodityj;
xy, is country i's total exports;
Zx,j  is the world's total exports
With its 'normalization' to remove the effects of price fluctuations and the importance of
particular commodities in world markets, the index is preferable to the simple share of a
group of products in  a country's lotal  exports. It allows clearer comparisons between
countries at any time, and allows changes in comparative advantage to be tracked over
time.  The measure reflects  the underlying comparative  advantage of  the  country in
particular commodities as determined by technology and factor endowments, modified by
8government policies designed to draw resources into favored sectors. A value of greater
than 1 is broadly suggestive of a revealed comparative advantage in sector i.  The RCA
indexes of  ASEAN 10 exports are computed at the SITC 2-digit levels and only some of
the important items are reported at the 3-digit level.
The index reveals that Vietnam's current comparative advantage lies in primary
commodities such as fish, cereals, hides, oilseeds, wood, rubber, coal, and crude oil. Its
export shares of rice (SITC 42) and coffee (SITC 71) are approximately 69.7 times and 17
times larger than the world average respectively. Vietnam is also strong in some labor-
intensive manufactured goods including travel goods, clothing and footwear.
Vietnam's export structure appears to be more or less complementary with higher-
income ASEAN members such as Singapore and Malaysia. However, with lower income
ASEAN members, Vietnam may compete for certain commodities. For instance, Thailand
and Myanmar are also leading exporters of rice with RCAs of 28.7 and 27.6 respectively.
Clothing (SITC 84) and footwear are also important for ASEAN in general, especially for
the new member countries.
III. Vietnam's Trade Regime
Although Vietnam liberalized substantially its trade and investment regime since
the latter half of the 1980s, Vietnam's trade regime reflects the legacy of its history as a
state dominated centrally planned economy. The state sector still enjoys various forms of
privileges including  access to  land, capital, bail-out  facilities, and  quota  allocations.
Inport  substitution linked to  state control and protection remains influential economic
ideas  (McCarty,  1999).  Export  industries  are promoted  by  providing  subsidies to
9countervail the high relative costs of intermediary products. Because of the importance of
this issue in the Vietnamese context, we consider it in some detail.
111.1.  Vietnam's Industrializationi/Modernization  Policy
With  the  objective  of  turning  Vietnam  into  an  industrial  country  by  2020,
Vietnam's industrialization/modernization  policy appears to be emphasizing the creation
of a diversified industrial structure. To reach that target, much of attention has been paid
to develop the industrial base through a combination of export orientation and import
substitution.  As  a part of this direction, Vietnam appears to be targeting on a set of
capital-intensive and so-called strategic industries and to be using trade and investment
policies as instruments to promote these industries.
So-called promotion of strategic industries or industry targeting strategies have
been advocated by a group of economists for the 'late-industrializing' countries such as
Japan; Korea; and Taiwan, China, (Amsden (1989); Wade (1990)).  The considerations
that are argued to provide grounds for selective state intervention include economies of
scale, externalities, and strategic shift of comparative advantage.  Wade, for example,
argues  that  liberal  trade  policies  and  reallocation  according  to  static  comparative
advantage only offer once-for all benefit, but do not specify a causal mechanism linking
realization  of  comparative  advantage to  higher  growth.  Wade  argues  that,  unlike
unalterable  natural  endowments, government  assistance  can  create  new  'acquired'
advantages, some  of which  are  industry-specific. The  short  run  allocative costs  of
establishing internationally competitive industries may be outweighed by the longer run
benefits of productivity change in the promoted sectors (Wade, 1990).
10In contrast, several neo-classical economists warn of the dangers of protectionism
that may be induced by the rhetoric of 'competitiveness.'  For instance, Corden argues
that, while there will always be sectoral competitiveness problems, they will not represent
a national loss of competitiveness. As is shown by the theory of comparative advantage,
all countries will have a comparative advantage in something. Policies of protection will
necessarily  reduce both  imports  and  exports  below  free  trade  levels,  reducing  the
competitiveness of export industries through both direct impacts on the cost of production
and real exchange rate appreciation that further increases the costs of exporters.  Corden,
for example, stresses that sectoral protection only benefits one industry at the expense of
others, with a net national loss through forgoing the gains from trade (Corden, 1994).
The policy implication is to resist the usual pressures for sectoral protection, and to favor
policies that raise national productivity (such as improvements in education and training
and the introduction of new technology), which would moderate adverse sectoral effects.
The provision of protection to  favored industries can be  expected to  increase
output levels in these industries, by diverting scarce skilled workers from other industries.
If the gains from "learning by doing" in these industries were high enough, then an import
substitution policy might increase growth rates even while foregoing some of the gains
from comparative advantage. The problem may lie with the choice of industries, but this
appears to be a problem difficult to avoid.  The available studies of openness and growth
suggest that protection policies, as actually applied, have substantially reduced economic
growth rates in most countries (see, for example, Sachs and Warner 1995; Dollar 1992).
The research results on openness and growth suggest the use of an approach to
development in which relatively open economic policies are used to stimulate expansion
11of the industries in which Vietnam currently has a comparative advantage. The relatively
higher  rates  of  growth  associated  with  economic  growth  would  then  allow  the
accumulation of capital and the development of the skills needed for modem industrial
development. The experience of the high performing East Asian countries has been clear
on this point.  All of these countries have had very high savings rates and have rapidly
upgraded their educational systems to increase their endowments of skilled labor (World
Bank  1993).  The increases in the stocks of these factors have been important forces
leading to the (relative) decline of the traditional agricultural sector and the process of
industrialization (Martin and Warr 1992; Gehlhar, Hertel and Martin 1994).
Rapid economic development involves rnany changes both in the structure of the
economy, and in economic policies.  There are many areas in which policy intervention
will be  required  if  economic agents are to  have  the  right  incentives.  The  needed
interventions will involve establishing a legal framework, and policies that rectify market
failures,  such  as  those  affecting investment  in  human  capital,  or  those  involving
externalities and public goods.  As Johnson (1955) has pointed out, tariff protection is a
very poor instrument for dealing vwith  any of the problems, such as stimulating infant
industries or dealing with externalities, that are usually used to justify it.  Policies that
directly address the problems, such as the provision of needed public goods or assistance
for education and training, are likely to be much better than trade barriers.  Given the
enormous challenges of development policy, particularly as highlighted by the East Asian
financial crisis, there seems to be  a strong case for governments to  focus on the best
available policies for dealing with the challenges before them.
111.2.  Foreign Direct Investment (IEDI)
12Since Vietnam is capital scare and needs to upgrade its technology, foreign direct
investment  (FDI)  has  the  potentially  very  important  role  in  promoting  Vietnam's
economic development. Since the promulgation of Foreign Investment Law in 1988, FDI
commitments to Vietnam totaled almost US$27 billion with a legal capital of $11 billion
from 1988 to 1997 (McCarthy, 1998) although FDI commitments fell sharply in 1998.4
Puga and Venables (1998) demonstrate that either trade liberalization or import
substitution policies may be used by low wage economies to attract industry, but these
two policies work through very different mechanisms.  If  import barriers are raised,
industries that seek higher economic profits are attracted, and this in turn leads to import
substituting industrialization.  Unilateral trade liberalization can also be  successful in
attracting industry because the availability of low cost intermediate goods and the real
exchange rate  depreciation 5 allow  foreign  firms  to  source  from  the  most  efficient
suppliers.  Although they both may be superficially 'successful'  in attracting industry,
they generate different welfare outcomes.  While the attraction of investment to export-
oriented industries undoubtedly makes the country better off,  increased investment in
import-substituting industries may actually reduce welfare.
Recent  studies  by  CIE  (1998, July)  and  McCarty (1998)  reveal  that  foreign
investment in Vietnam is being directed toward sectors with relatively high levels of
4New  commitments fell from $8.5 billion in 1996  to $4.0 billion in 1997 and $1.8 billion in 1998 (World
Bank, 1998b).
5 Trade liberalization reduces the prices of the nontraded goods purchased  by exporters as well as their
prices of intermediate inputs.
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protection.  It has been observed that the emphasis of policy seems to be on building up
joint ventures between state firms and foreign investors so that physical capital levels of
output grow rapidly, rather than encouraging the growth of competitive firms.  Most joint
ventures were with state enterprises rather than with the domestic private sector.  Dollar
(1998) warns that powerful alliances among line ministries, large state enterprises, and
foreign investors, can create an environment that hampers the development of domestic
private enterprises. Protection of powerful up-stream industries, whom the government is
often persuaded to protect, is particu.larly  problernatic since this would impede the growth
of downstream manufacturers7 (Flatters, 1998ab).
111.3.  Nominal and Effective Rates of Protection
Table 3 shows a summary of Vietnam's tariff protection.
6 For instance,  McCarty  (1998)  observes  that  among  the five  highest  sector  recipients  of FDI  (in the traded-
goods  sector),  cement,  fuels,  vehicles,  electrical  machinery,  and  beverages,  all the sectors  except  fuels
are producing  import-substituting  goods.
7 An example  of plastic product  (downstream)  and petrochemical  (upstream)  industries  is relevant here.
Historically,  petrochemical  industries  were initiated  and developed  with the government  intervention  in
many Asian countries  including  Japan, Taiwan,  Korea followed  by some ASEAN  countries. However,
Flatters  (1998a)  points  out the danger  of similar  policies  for  Vietnam. The plastic  products  sector  has  been
one of the most successful  industries  in Vietnam  growing  at an average  rate of almost 30 percent since
1990. Plastics  are basic  input  into a wide r;mge  of final consumer  goods as well as an essential  component
in various industrial products (e.g. electronics, electrical appliances and vehicle parts).  A crucial factor in
the success of the plastic products industry in Vietnam has been the free availability of competitively priced
raw  materials.  Imports  of plastic  raw rraterials  (PVC resin,  polyethylene (PE), polypropylene (PP),
polystyrene (PS)) are free of import duties and other non-tariff barriers.  Recently, the joint venture project
between  Japan's  Mitsui  Corporation  and  the  state-owned  Viet  Nam  National  Plastics  Corporation
(Vinaplast) to manufacture PVC had petitioned to impose 25-40 percent  import duty on all PVC  resin
imnports. The government agreed to grant an import tariff of 3 percent and a further import surcharge of 5
percent (Flatters, 1998b). The case of plastic industries illustrates the protection of upstream industry hurts
rather than helps the downstream users of these products.
14Table 3. The Structure of Vietnam's Protection
Nominal Protection of  Effective Rate of Protection
Import Tariff  (ERP)
GTAP  Description  Simple  Weighted  ERP for  ERP  for
Average  Average  imort  Eo
Substitution  Production
(%/0)  (/0)  (%)  (%)
1  Paddy rice  5.0  5.0  4.2  -3.8
2  Wheat  3.0  3.0  3.0  0.0
3  Cereal grains  5.9  2.6  -4.6  -10.0
4  Vegetables,  fruits,  nuts  24.3  27.2  41.6  -8.1
5  Oil seeds  8.6  6.5  4.4  -7.1
6  Sugarcane,sugarbeet  10.0  10.0  9.7  -3.8
7  Plant-based fibers  3.9  4.2  1.3  -6.0
8  Crops  n.e.c.  13.2  6.2  4.5  -5.8
9  Bovine  cattle,  sheep,  goats,  horses  4.5  4.8  0.9  -7.1
10  Animal products n.e.c.  5.0  3.7  -1.5  -7.4
12  Wool, silk-worm cocoons  3.0  1.3  -2.2  -4.2
13  Forestry  4.0  1.2  -20.5  -22.9
14  Fishing  16.9  18.9  66.6  45.7
15  Coal  3.8  3.4  -14.4  -22.2
16  Oil  4.5  1.0  -13.9  -15.9
17  Gas  14.1  15.5  24.5  -13.3
18  Minerals n.e.c.  2.3  1.1  -21.4  -27.0
19  Bovine cattle, sheep,goat meat  12.2  10.3  12.2  -3.5
20  Meatproductsn.e.c.  18.1  27.3  43.3  -5.4
21  Vegetable oils and fats  13.1  12.3  1.4  -98.5
22  Dairy products  16.7  14.5  16.3  -5.7
23  Processed rice  7.5  7.5  8.0  -22.5
24  Sugar  30.0  30.0  Nae  na'
25  Food products n.e.c.  28.6  20.1  59.6  -48.3
26  Beverage and tobacco products  52.1  50.2  Naa  naa
27  Textiles  29.4  30.0  115.0  -138.0
28  Wearing apparel  49.2  49.4  229.8  -231.9
29  Leather products  18.8  13.5  -15.1  -67.1
30  Wood products  18.7  11.9  15.2  -19.3
31  Paper products, publishing  20.0  19.4  88.1  -88.5
32  Petroleum, coal products  9.6  44.0  Naa  naa
33  Chemical, rubber, plastic, products  8.8  6.4  -0.1  -40.3
34  Mineral products n.e.c.  20.7  23.8  69.6  -52.3
35  Ferrous metals  5.3  6.0  3.7  -25.3
36  Metals n.e.c.  5.8  10.4  21.9  -103.8
37  Metal products  18.5  16.6  34.5  -33.9
38  Motor vehicles and parts  22.6  18.6  186.4  -200.7
39  Transport equipmentn.e.c.  13.2  28.3  56.6  -32.9
40  Electronic equipment  9.7  10.7  13.8  -18.4
41  Machinery and equipmentn.e.c.  7.4  8.1  -0.6  -29.3
42  Manufactures n.e.c.  24.7  22.7  64.3  -45.1
Total  15.6  19.0
a ERP has not been defined since value added at world prices was negative.
Sources:  Centre for International Economics, Vietnam's  Tariff Schedule (February  1998); Fukase and
Martin (1998) ; GTAP4 database
The first two columns show the nominal rate of protection (NRP) whereas the
second two show the effective rate of protection (ERP).  Vietnam's current nominal rate
of protection indicates 15.6 percent of simple average and 19.0 percent of trade weighted
15averages. There is a general tendency for Vietnam's tariff structure to be relatively low in
capital goods and raw materials and higher for finished goods.  This pattern of protection
increases the returns to value adding factors in the final goods industries.  Even quite
moderate tariffs on final goods can lead to sharp increases in the returns to value added in
a particular sector if intermediate irnputs  are a large share of total costs.  Imports of most
basic industrial raw materials are relatively free of import restrictions since Vietnam does
not yet have significant upstream steel or plastics industries (Flatters, 1  998a).  For many
goods which are not produced in  Vietnam, the tariff rates are virtually zero.  This
confers a great advantage on domestic users of these products.  An indication of the total
impact of protection can be obtained using the Effective Rate of Protection (ERP).
The ERP differs from the NRP by taking into account the trade barriers that are
imposed on the intermediate inputs used in the production of goods. 8 Protection granted
8 The effective  rate of protection  (ERP)  is defined  as the percentage  change  in producers' value-added,  as a
result of taxes  on trade,  over the level of value-added  that would  have prevailed  in the absence  of those
taxes. For import  substituting  industries,  the formula  for calculating  the ERP is
ERPm  =('VAm- VA,*)/VA,*
where  VA,, is industry  j's value  added  at domestic  prices and VAj*  is value  added  at world  prices. VAmj  and
VAj* are computed  as
VAin 1 = VOj- E INTij
VAj*  = VO)(I + tj)  - E  INTi/(J  +tJ)
where VOj  is the value of output  of industryj,  INTh  is the use of intermediate  input  i by industryj, and tj is
the nominal  tariff  rate imposed  on industryj.  The ERP  for export  production  can  be
ERPX=(VAj-  VAj*)/VA j*
where
VA =VYOj/(I  + t) - -N T,
VAj*  = VOI/( +  t  - E INT,J(1  +tj
Value  added at domestic  prices for export  production  (VAj) differs  from  that for import  substitution  (VAj 1)
since  exporters  face  world  prices for  their sales.
16to final goods increases returns to value adding factors in a sector. By contrast, taxes on
intermediate inputs reduce the returns to value adding factors.  Protection has different
implications for import substituting and export oriented activities.  Higher protection on
outputs raises the domestic prices for import competing goods and increases the returns
involved in producing them.  Exporting activities have to face world prices for their sales
and so do not benefit from protection on their output.  They can only be harmed by
protection.  The ERP measures provided in this paper capture the direct adverse impacts
of protection on these firms.  There is an additional adverse impact that arises from the
increases in the prices of nontraded goods-the  real exchange rate appreciation effect of
protection.
The ERPs for Vietnamese industries have been calculated using the input-output
table information from the  GTAP Version 4  database.  The table  reveals very high
effective rates of assistance for import substitution in industries such as wearing apparel,
motor vehicles and parts, and textiles.
The fourth column of Table 3 shows the effective rate of protection applying to a
firm that produces for the export market, but  is unable to benefit from exemptions of
import duties on imported inputs.  As expected, the effect of the tariff regime on such a
firm is negative, because of the cost-increasing effects of higher prices for intermediate
goods.
It is worth noting that the negative effects for exporters are the largest for such
industries as apparel and motor vehicles implying increased costs of intermediate goods.
This is because the government tends to  use tariff and other protective measures on
17intennediate goods to  achieve the localization objectives (see Box  1).9 The resulting
increases in the costs of other firms 10 tends to lead other import competing industries to
lobby  for  even  higher  levels  of  nominal  rate  of  protection,  and  diminishes  the
competitiveness of export industries.
Two cautions should be born in mind to interpret these protection figures.  First,
these figures do not include the protective effects of Non Tariff Barriers (NTB).  A set of
important industries, including cerment,  steel, sugar and paper industries, is protected by
quantitative restrictions rather than tariff.
Second, the ERP for expo:rt  production does not include the firms who benefit
from duty-draw back system. In fact, Vietnam has applied a number of measures such as
duty drawback system and export-processing zones to compensate exporters for some of
the costs  which  Vietnam's  own import barriers impose upon  them. However,  these
measures never offset fully the negative effects of protection  (Flatters, 1998b; CIE,
1998; Herrou-Aragon, 199911).  ln addition, they may hinder the development of
Box 1. Car Industry Policy in Vietnam: On the Road to Nowhere?
A modem car industry  embodies  relatively  high technology  both in its processes  and its
products and  provides great  scope for  the development of backward  linkages to  component
manufactures.  For this reason, many countries  have attempted to persuade international  auto
9  Regarding  to production  and assemnbly  of electronics  appliance,  the localization  ratio is at least 20 percent
for the first  2 years  and  must  be increased  annually;  regarding  to production  and assembly  of
automobile,  the required  localization  ratio is 5 percent  after the first  5 years and  must be increased  to
reach  30 percent  after the first 10  years;  for motorcycle  and spare  parts, the required  localization  ratio
is 5-10  percent  after  the first  2 years  and  must  be increased  to 60 percent  after  the first  5 years  (WTO,
1998).
0 Both  as a direct  consequence  of higher  prices of traded  goods,  and higher  prices of nontraded  goods  (the
real  exchange  rate appreciation  effect  of higher  protection).
1 Herrou-Aragon  (1999)  investigates  the case  of the Dominican  Republic  where  an escalating  itport tariff
rate structure  aimed at protecting import-substitution  activities coexists with  successful  export
incentives. Using a factor-specific  general  equilibrium  model, he found  that the overall  impact of
protection  policies  on output  of exportable  activities  could  still  be substantial.  The main  reason  is that
protection  results in increases  in prices of non-traded  goods and in nominal  wages, so-called  real
exchange  rate appreciation,  reducing  the competitiveness  of exporters.
18firms to establish domestic production in replacement of car imports.  In Vietnam, this has been
done by  imposing high  protection on  car imports and  at the  same time, by  promoting  self-
sufficiency in production through local content programs.
The automobile industry is characterized by considerable economies of scale.  As is
shown in Figure A, the firms face a downward sloping average cost (AC) curve.  The high rate of
protection on automobiles initially allows automobile makers to sell at  high prices at P 1 and
produce at Qo.  The initial firms are extremely profitable because of the protection, and this
profitability attracts additional entrants.  Firms continue to enter until each firm is operating at
sub-optimal scale at Ql.  Given the strong scale economies prevailing in this industry, the small
output level of the firms pushes up their average costs.  The rise in average costs eventually
eliminates all excess profits and hence removes the incentive for additional firms to enter, until a
new equilibrium is reached where excess profits are zero.
Figure A.  AC
P 0 -
Po  --  - - - - - --  - -
Qi  Qo
The  high  rate  of  protection  on  automobiles  initially  attracted  fourteen  foreign
automakers such as Toyota, Ford to set up joint ventures in Vietnam.  However, high protection
resulted in high production costs rather than high profits.
Vietnam's  domestic  market  is  small,  which  in  turn,  hampers  the  achievement  of
economies of scale.  Given  the low level  of per  capita income of  $311  (around $1,590 in
purchasing power parity terms in 1997), demand for vehicles is expected to be around 60,000 per
year by the year 2,000 (Vietnam Economic Times, May 1997).  In addition, a proliferation of
models and corresponding fragmentation of production among component suppliers has resulted
in small production runs and high costs for many local component suppliers.
The problem  is exacerbated by the government's  local content policy. In addition to
imposing the localization ratio, Vietnam pursues a localization objective through the structure of
tariffs and manipulation of quotas on a variety of completely and semi knocked down kits (CKD
and SKD) (CIE, 1998). For instance, each approved SKD kit requires that some parts be deleted
in order that they might be supplied by local producers, raising the costs of producing the final
goods expensive. Such schemes lead to endless political pressure for revision and fragmentation,
and frequently lock in production of vehicles using obsolete technology (Pursell, 1999).
These policies are likely to be extremely costly.  Consumers lose from the high prices,
the government loses potential revenues, while producers lose from sub-optimal scale and high
average costs.  The industry continues to lobby for further increases in protection given the high
costs of production.  When it is successful, a short period of increased profitability follows, until
the benefits are reduced by additional entry.  Then, profits  are again at normal levels, and the
cycle of lobbying starts over again.
19integrated system  of  manufacture of  exports  and  products  of  associated  supporting
industries, because they discriminate between imports of items for export production and
domestic producers of intermediate goods (Flatters, 1998b). For instance, duty draw back
system cannot normally compensate 'indirect' exporters who produce inputs for exporters
(e.g. domestic  textile producers for  garments, plastics producer  for  electronics).  2 A
system of high tariffs and deep exemptions, such as is used in Vietnam tends to stimulate
exports from assembly-type operations, rather than from sectors with strong forward and
backward  linkages  to  other  domestic  sectors.  Under  these  circumstances,  further
liberalization can be  expected to  stimulate the development of  exports with  a  higher
proportion of domestic value-added.
111.4.  Non Tariff Measures (NTMs)
A complex set of non-tariff measures is used in Vietnam.
Quantitative restrictions are used to 'regulate supply and demand' and to protect
the  domestic  production  of  'potential'  and  'infant'  industries  (WTO,  1998).  The
regulations on import quota and the list of prohibited imports/exports  appear to change
from  time  to  time.  Circular  No.  01/1998TM/XNK  stipulates  that  the  following
12  In Vietnam's  garment  industry,  high import tariffs for protecting  import-substitution  activities  coexist
with  a relatively  successful  duty-drawback  system  for exports. A significant  part of irnported  material
for garment industry  is brought in lirough international  subcontracting  agreements  where foreign
partners  generally  provide  most of necessary  materials  as well  as designing  and marketing  functions.
This  is known  as CMT  (cut,  make  and  trim).  Generally,  the value  added  is low  in this kind  of business.
Since  most of the production  is targeted  at export markets,  producers  have duty-free  access to raw
material  imports.  In contrast,  local textile  manufactures  must bear the costs of import barriers. The
discriminatory  nature  of the duty  drawvback  system  hampers  integrating  local manufactures  of textiles
into export  production  of garments. Currently,  the industrial  linkage  of Vietnamese  domestic  textile
and  garment  sector,  between  up-stream  (fiber  production),  mid-stream  (fabric  production  and dyeing)
and down-stream  sector (garment  manufacturing)  remains  very weak.  The weak linkage  within  the
20commodities are subject to import quotas:  petroleum, fertilizer, cement, construction
glass, paper, sugar, and steel of various kinds (Ministry of Trade, 1998).  Following
Decision 11/1998/QD-TTg dated January 23, 1998, imports of weapons, antiques, drugs,
toxic chemicals, pornographic and reactionary publications, firecrackers, cigarettes, used
consumer goods, used spare parts of automobiles are banned.  In addition, imports of
automobiles and motorcycles of all kinds were not allowed to be imported (as of February
14, 1998). Rice exports are subject to export quotas.  The  export prohibitions for wood
of various kinds and raw rattan apply due to the environmental reasons.
Vietnam's  customs  valuation  is  based  on  the  price  written  on  the  contract
(contract price).  For 20 groups of commodities, Vietnam defines minimum prices for
import duty valuation (Ministry of Finance, 1998).13  The prices for G7 countries and
non-G7 countries are differentiated, thus  effective tariff rates may be  higher for the
commodities made in G7 countries. While there are undoubtedly serious problems of
understatement in customs values, there is a real risk that such customs valuation rules
can lead to large distortions and introduce substantial barriers to trade.  For this reason,
the GATT rules on Customs valuation involve a strong bias towards the use of invoice
prices (WTO 1995).
Price control measures include maximum import pricing  and minimum export
pricing.  The maximum import prices are imposed on large volume imports of certain
textile and garment industry is constraint of expansion of the industry as well as export (Technical
Group, Institute of Economics (Vietnam) - IDRC (Canada), 1999).
13 These include:  miLk;vegetable  oils;food seasoning (monosodium  glutamate); sugar and
confectionery;beverages;cement;paints;shampoos  and soaps;plastics;  tires and tubes; papers and
boards;sanitary ware and ceramic tiles; construction glass; iron and steel; gas cooker; electric
appliances and components;accumulator  and battery; automobile;  motorcycles and parts; and furniture
of various kinds (Ministry of Finance, 1998).
21products  such as  fertilizer, petroleum, iron  and steel, cement, newsprint  and writing
paper,  and certain machinery and equipment. Minimum export prices apply to rice and
crude oil (WTO, 1998).  It is difficult to determine the extent to which these policies
restrict trade. If effective, they are likely to introduce serious distortions and, even if
currently ineffective, they introduce a serious problem of nontransparency into the trade
regime.
Formal access to foreign exchange is still subject to considerable restriction (CIE,
1998), although the multiple exchange rate regime that prevailed prior to 1989 has been
unified.  Foreign  invested entities are generally responsible for balancing their own
foreign exchange requirements.  Only entities involved in projects producing specific
import substitutes, specified infrastructure projects and designated important projects are
guaranteed conversion of local currency.
IV.  Nature of AFTA and Vietnam's Liberalization Stratewv
IV.1 Common Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT) Scheme
The ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) was formally established in 1992 in order
to realize an FTA within 15 years beginning 1 January 1993.  The Common Effective
Preferential  Tariff  (CEPT)  scheme  was  designed  to  bring  down  tariffs  on  all
manufactured and processed agricultural products to 0-5 percent within the 15 year time-
frame.  hi  September  1994,  during  the  26th  ASEAN  Economic  Ministers  (AEM)
Meeting, the time frame was shortened from the original fifteen years to ten years, with
the aim of achieving the AFTA goals by the year 2003 (by 2006 for Vietnam and 2008 for
22the Lao PDR and Myanmar). Another important accomplishment of that meeting was to
include all unprocessed agricultural products in the CEPT scheme.
Under the CEPT scheme, four lists, -- the Inclusion List (IL), the Temporary
Exclusion List (TEL), the Sensitive List (SL), and the General Exceptions List (GEL), --
are used as key instruments to determine the pace and scope of the liberalization.  The IL
consists of the items subject to the tariff reductions immediately to bring them down to
the range of 0-5 percent by the year 2003.  During the 6th ASEAN Summit in December
1998, the  six original ASEAN members  agreed to  accelerate the implementation of
AFTA by one year from 2003 to 2002 for most of the items in the Inclusion List.1 4 The
items in the TEL are initially excluded from tariff reductions, but these items are to be
transferred to the IL by 2000 in  5 equal installments beginning from  1996 and then
reduced to 0-5 percent by 2003.  The SL is the list of unprocessed agricultural products
and to be phased into the IL between 2001-2003 and to be in the 0-5 percent range by
2010.15 In principle, the GEL is intended to consist of items which satisfy Article XX of
the GATT (ASEAN Secretariat 1993a). These goods may be permanently excluded from
tariff reductions  for  reasons  such  as  national security, protection  of  public  morals,
protection of human, animal and plant life and health, or the protection of articles of
artistic, historic or archaeological value.
A key feature of the CEPT is that the concessions are granted on a reciprocal,
product by product basis.  There are three conditions for a product to be  eligible for
4 www.aseansec.org
lS  As of 1996,  there were a total 2,025 tariff lines defined as unprocessed agricultural products and they
were mapped into three lists:  1,387  tarifflines were in the immediate Inclusion List; 377 tarifflines
were in the Temnporary  Exclusion List and 261 tariff lines were in the Sensitive List (ASEAN
Secretariat, 1996).
23concessions under the CEPT.  1) The product has to be included in the IL of the both
importing and exporting countries;  2)  To receive all concessions, the product must have
an CEPT tariff of 20 percent or below.  If the tariff on a product that a country has
included in the CEPT is above 20 percent, then it is eligible for concessions only in those
member countries that also impose a CEPT rate that is higher than 20 percent;  3) it has to
satisfy the local content requirement of 40 percent.  In the short-run, the reciprocal nature
of the  CEPT  scheme provides incentives for the member  countries  to  include  their
commodities in the IL and to reduce tariffs below 20 percent to receive concessions.  The
CEPT also involves a phased reduction in tariffs.
Another important feature of the CEPT is that member countries are required to
eliminate quantitative restrictions on products on which they receive CEPT concessions,
and  eliminate other non-tariff barriers within  a period  of  five years  after  receiving
concessions.  Based on the UNCIAD  classification of NTBs, a working definition of
NTBs  covers  para-tariff  measures,  price  control  measures,  finance  measures,
monopolistic measures, and technical measures (  ASEAN Secretariat, 1995).
VI2.The liberalization schedules of ASEAN member countries
In contrast with the former Preferential Trading Arrangement (PTA) scheme, the
ASEAN members have made substantial commitments to the AFTA/CEPT scheme in
terms of scope and degree of liberalization.  Table 4 shows the number of tariff lines that
the member countries have included in  each list.
Overall, 54,367 tariff lines out of 55,525 lines are either in the IL or TEL.  This
means that 97.9 percent of tariff lines will be between 0-5 percent by 2003 (by 2006 for
24Vietnam and 2008 for the Lao PDR and Myanmar). The share of the SL and GEL appears
to be small relative to the IL and TEL.
Table 4. CEPT Product Lists
IL  TEL  SL  GEL
Country  Tariff  Share  Tariff  Share  Tariff  Share  Tariff  Share  Total
Lines  (%)  Lines  (a)  Lines  (%)  Lines  (%)
Brunei  6105  94.0  135  2.1  14  0.2  239  3.7  6493
donesia  6622  91.8  545  7.6  4  0.1  45  0.6  7216
lao  PDR  533  15.0  2831  79.7  96  2.7  91  2.6  3551
Malaysia  8648  95.1  276  3.0  104  1.1  63  0.7  9091
Myanmar  2356  43.1  2987  54.6  21  0.4  108  2.0  5472
Philippines  5221  91.6  385  6.8  68  1.2  28  0.5  5702
Singapore  5739  98.0  0  0.0  0  0.0  120  2.0  5859
Thailand  9040  99.1  79  0.9  7  0.1  0  0.0  9126
Vietnam  1718  57.0  1147  38.0  23  0.8  127  4.2  3015
45982  82.8  8385  15.1  337  0.6  821  1.5  55525
Source: ASEAN Secretariat, CEPT Product Lists (December, 1998)
However,  some  commodities  in  the  Sensitive  and  General  Exclusion  lists
represent high trade value and/or high tariff rates. For instance, Indonesia included a high
portion of unprocessed agricultural products in the SL including rice, wheat, and  soy
beans.  The 23  tariff lines  alone represent about  11 percent  of  import values  from
ASEAN. For the new members, the proportions of the GEL are typically higher relative
to the other members.  For Vietnam and the Lao PDR, for instance, the import values in
the  GEL  correspond  to  10 percent  and  37  percent  of  total  imports  from  ASEAN
respectively.
Before the ASEAN accession, the new members signed MFN agreements with all
the other ASEAN members. 16 Since the late 1980s, the ASEAN countries have lowered
substantially their  MFN rates.  However, the overall tariff  averages mask  important
1
6 MFN  status,  national  treatment,  and  transparency  are the three  pre-conditions  of the ASEAN  accession.
These  principles  are consistent  with  the WTO.
25differences in protection across sectors. Annex  2 shows both simple and weighted tariff
averages by sector.  There is a general tendency for the protection rates for agricultural
commodities and labor intensive industries to be relatively high in the ASEAN countries.
VI.3. Analyses of Vietnam's Liberalization Schedule
The  CEPT  Product  Lists  (December  1998)  obtained  from  the  ASEAN
Secretariat  was  analyzed below.  Annex  3  summarizes  the  structure  of  Vietnam's
liberalization schedule.  Import andl  export values obtained from the UNCTAD Trains
database (1996) have been assigned to  each category in  each list.  Vietnam's  CEPT
schedule suggests that 1) revenue implications, 2) export concessions, and 3) the impacts
on domestic industries were key criteria in the choice of items to be included in each list.
1) Revenue Implications
In 1996, Vietnam collected 15.0 trillions in trade tax revenues which represented
5.8 percent of GDP or 24.6 percent of total government revenues (CIE, 1998). Import tax
from  ASEAN  sources  are estimated to  account  for  45  percent  of  total  import  tax
revenues.  Annex 3 shows that the iimport  values corresponding to the IL, TEL, SL, GEL
are estimated to be at 26 percent, 37 percent, 0.04 percent, and 37 percent respectively.
Annex 3 shows that the tariff rates of the items that Vietnam included in the IL are
relatively low representing 7.3 percent on an import-weighted average.  In contrast, the
items in the GEL account for some 37 percent of Vietnam's  imports from ASEAN and
the average tariff rate on these goods is high at 42.3 percent.  This implies that some of
the items with high trade volume wvith  high tariff rates are currently excluded from the
26AFTA commitments implying that about 65 percent of tariff revenues from ASEAN are
shielded from the CEPT tariff reduction.
2) Export Concession
On the export side, Annex 3 demonstrates that the share of export values assigned
to  the IL, TEL,  SL,  GEL are 63  percent,  36 percent,  0.8  percent,  and  0.8 percent
respectively.  This  implies  that  Vietnam  included  99 percent  of  its  export-oriented
commodities in the CEPT commitments.
3) Implications on Domestic Industries
Binding the liberalization schedule with AFTA commitments can be a useful
defense against potential protectionism.  An announcement that such protection will be
reduced  under  AFTA  is  likely  to  encourage  import-competing industries  to  begin
adjusting to the changes. For industries in which the current Vietnamese competitiveness
is low, such as cement and construction steel, the products are currently in the TEL and
the tariffs begin to  be  reduced in  2003 which  is the  latest target  date  for AFTA.1 7
'Luxury' household appliances such as electric fans, air conditioners, refrigerators and
washing machines will begin to be brought down in 2002 or 2003. Vietnam maintains a
policy of encouraging domestic sugar production.  The ASEAN agreed to  include two
sugar items in the Sensitive List. Vietnam will cut tariffs on sugar by 2010. Furthermore,
the announced liberalization is  likely to  attract export-oriented industries because the
availability of  low  cost  intermediate goods and  the  real  exchange  rate  depreciation
facilitate foreign firms to source from the most efficient suppliers.
7 For instance,  the current  tariff  rates for  cement  and construction  steel  are 15 percent  and  30 percent
respectively. Their tariffs begin to phase in 2003 and will be 5 percent in 2006.
27However, a set of commodities including petroleum, cars and other vehicles with
less than  15 seats  and motor  cycles (including in  SKD  and  CKD  forms), alcoholic
beverages and tobacco, are included in the GEL, and so are currently excluded from the
CEPT commitment.  The limited scope of AFTA-partly  because many of the items are
currently  excluded  from  the  AFTA  commitments  and  partly  because  the  share  of
Vietnam's  trade with ASEAN is relatively small, suggests that Vietnam  should treat
AFTA liberalization as an initial step toward broader liberalization rather than as a single
undertaking.
In  addition  to  the  tariff  cuts,  Vietnam  is  required  to  eliminate  quantitative
restrictions and other non-tariff barriers under AFTA.  Although Vietnam is committed to
eliminating licenses and quantitative restrictions,  some non-tariff measures have tended
to become stronger in recent years (McCarty, 1999).
V. Modeline Approach
V.1. Model Structure
The Global Trade Analyses (GTAP) model is a relatively standard static multi-
sector multi-region Applied General Equilibrium (AGE) model which  incorporates the
necessary links between factor demands, production structures, trade and protection.  The
GTAP model is documented comprehensively  in Hertel (1997), with updated information
on the GTAP web site.18 The model assumes that firms use constant returns to  scale
technology in  perfectly competitive product market.  Consumption in  the household
sector is determined by the constantt  difference of elasticities (CDE) functional form.  The
18 www.agecon.purdue.edu/gtap/
28equilibrium levels of production and consumption are determined by global demand and
supply of the product and zero economic profit for firms. A key assumption of the model
is that Vietnamese consumers distinguish between imported and domestic goods, and
between imports by country of origin, under the so-called Armington (1969) assumption.
V.2. Theory of Preferential Trade Liberalization
In  this  section,  we  outline  the  framework used  to  evaluate  the  effects  of
preferential liberalization under AFTA.  To do  this, we  first  consider the  effects of
changes in the rates of protection that Vietnam levies on its imports.  Then, we consider
the implications of changes in the protection imposed by Vietnam's trading partners.
The impacts of trade liberalization differ between large and small countries.  A
large country can affect international terms of trade by raising world prices of its imports
and by lowering world prices of its exports.  In contrast, since a small country cannot
influence international terms of trade, it faces world prices in its imports and exports.
Since Vietnam is a relatively large economy in some of the products which it trades
extensively,  we use the large country assumption in this analysis.
The concepts of trade creation and trade diversion are central to the evaluation of
discriminatory trade liberalization. Trade creation measures the gains from expanding
trade  in  the  products  being  liberalized. Trade  diversion, by  contrast, measures  the
reductions in trade of products disadvantaged by the preferential liberalization. To aid
understanding of the concept of trade  creation, the market  for goods imported  from
ASEAN is illustrated in Figure 5A.
29Figure 5A. Welfare impacts of Vietnam's liberalization of partner imports
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We choose the  units  of  each product so that  its  world price  is  unity in  the initial
equilibrium (Pw =  1).  In the initial equilibrium, Vietnam imposes a tariff t  from the
ASEAN members (Pd = PW  + t).  Let us now introduce preferential tariff rate tase. through
a  reduction in  the  tariff on  imports from  the ASEAN  partners.  This reduces tariff
revenues  on  initial  imports  from  ASEAN  by  Pd abPasean. However,  the  gains  to
consumers are greater since they are able to increase the quantity of ASEAN goods that
they purchase.  Following the decline in the domestic price, consumers move down the
(compensated) demand curve for A.SEAN  goods, Dasean  from initial quantity mo to final
quantity ml.  Consumer surplus increases by the area Pd  abPasean  +  abc. In addition, with
the increase in the imports from ASEAN, the loss of revenues is partially compensated by
the area bced. In sum, the net gain to Vietnam in this market is approximated by the area
aced. This is the welfare benefit from trade creation
If the import distortion beirtg liberalized is the only distortion in the economy,
then the welfare impacts of liberalization can be analyzed by considering only the trade
creation effects depicted above.  If, however, there are distortions in other markets, the
30problem is one of the second best and the impacts of liberalization on the trade flows
through these barriers must be considered.  Perhaps the best known type of second-best
welfare effect is trade diversion.  In the analytical framework used in this  study, this
potential source of loss is readily seen by examining conditions in the market for imports
from non-partner countries, represented in Figure 5B.
Figure  5B.  Impact  of  preferential  liberalization  on  imports  from  non-partner
countries.
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Assuming that imports from non-partner countries are substitutes for imports from
partner countries, the reduction in the price of imports from partner countries shown in
Figure 5A leads to a reduction in the demand for goods from non-partner countries. This
reduction shifts the demand curve for these goods from Do to  DI.  This has adverse
welfare consequences that  can be  measured by the tariff revenues collected on non-
partner imports.  This reduction in tariff revenues corresponds to a reduction in welfare
because each unit of the good that was previously imported was worth Pd to consumers in
the import market, but cost the country only Pw to purchase in world markets.  The
welfare loss to Vietnam is the loss in tariff revenues, shown by the area abdc.
31Whether there is a net gain or loss to Vietnam depends on the relative sizes of the
two shaded areas. Clearly, the gains from trade creation will be larger, the higher'  the rate
of protection initially applied on these trade flows, the more price responsive is the total
domestic demand for these goods, (particularly, the more substitutable are domestic and
imported goods) and, if the size of the increase in trade is proportional to the initial trade
volume, the larger the initial trade volume. Trade diversion costs are likely to be greater
the higher the tariffs applied in the non-partner markets and the greater the reduction in
the quantity of imports from these markets.
Import liberalization typically brings about an increase in exports by changing the
real exchange rate.  Lowering the domestic price of at least some imports will cause
consumers to substitute these goods for nontraded goods.  The reduction in demand for
the nontraded good lowers its price relative to the prices of traded goods-a  relative price
change frequently termed a real exchange rate depreciation (Salter 1959). This reduction
in the profitability of nontraded good production makes production for export relatively
more attractive and increases the supply of exports.
The real exchange rate depreciation following import liberalization is represented
by a shift in the export supply function from ESO  to ES, in Figure 5C-1.  The outward
shift in the export supply curve in,creases  exports from xo to xl.  If Vietnam's exports
have a market power in this market, the increase in exports in turn leads to a deterioration
in the terms of trade whose welfare impact is measured by the area abed.
32Figure 5C-1.  Terms of Trade impacts resulting from increased export supply (a
large country case)
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Figure 5C-2. Terms of Trade impacts of improved access to partner markets.
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If  liberalization  in  Vietnam  results  in  reciprocal  liberalization  by  Vietnam's
trading partners on Vietnam's exports to those partners, then Vietnam will experience a
terms of trade gain on the export side.  The reduction in the ASEAN partners' tariff on
exports from Vietnam shifts the demand curve for exports from Dpo  to Dpl. In Figure 5C-
332, this gain is shown by the move from price pw' to pp. The result is an increase in both
the volume of exports from Vietnam to ASEAN, and an increase in the price received for
these exports (shaded  area efgh).  The net  effect of  terms of  trade  depends on the
difference between the area abcd and efgh.
All of the impacts of discriminatory trade liberalization outlined above need to be
taken into account simultaneously in  forning  an  overall assessment of  the proposed
approach. While  diagrams of  th,  type shown  above aid understanding, they do  not
provide a  practical basis  for making an  overall  evaluation. By contrast,  quantitative
models allow all of these effects to be taken into account at once.
V.3. Data and Liberalization Shocks
Particular attention in this study is given to how the changes in relative prices
resulting from tariff reductions affect the key variables such as trade patterns, terms of
trade, factor returns, and welfare levels. Another focus was given how each policy affects
Vietnam's  industrial  structure.  The  experiments  conducted  using  the  model  are
comparative-static in  nature  ancd we  do  not  directly  consider  the  effects  of  this
liberalization on  growth rates nor  the  'natural'  growth  of trade  which  would  occur
without further liberalization.
The protection levels that the ASEAN-5 apply to each other are set at the level of
2003,  being  already  reduced  to  reflect  reciprocal  concessions.  The  shocks  to  be
calculated are  the reduction of tariff under the AFTA plan both by Vietnam against
ASEAN 5 and by the ASEAN 5 countries against Vietnam. Vietnam's  tariff schedule
(February, 1998) was obtained from the Centre for International Economics to compute
MFN tariff rates and the tariff reductions agreed under AFTA were obtained from the
34CEPT  Product  List  (ASEAN  Secretariat,  1997/1998).  Taking  into  account  the
'reciprocal'  concessions, the bilateral concessional tariff rates were computed item by
item bases  at the 6-digit level for ASEAN 5 and 4-digit level for Vietnam and then
averaged over 13 aggregated categories.
Given the importance of Vietnam's trade with  APEC countries,  an additional
simulation was designed to investigate what happens if Vietnam and the other APEC
countries liberalize simultaneously under the APEC framework.  Unlike AFTA, APEC
trade liberalization is based, in principle, on a unilateral and non-discriminatory basis.19
As a very rough hypothetical scenario, we investigate what  happens if  all the APEC
member countries reduce tariffs to 2.5 percent on an MFN basis.  Since the timeframe of
liberalization under APEC is different from AFTA (2010 for industrialized economies
and 2020 for developing economies), and APEC commitments are not binding in the
same way as AFTA, the scenario should not be viewed as reflecting the commitments of
the APEC member countries.  Rather, APEC simulation is aimed to have a preliminary
idea  on  what  happens  if  all  the  APEC members  liberalize unilaterally  on  a  non-
discriminatory basis.
The simulations are summarized as below.
19  At their  meeting  in Bogor  in 1994,  the goal  was set to realize  a free and open  trade and  investment  area in
the Asia-Pacific  region  no later  than  2010  for industrialized  economies  and  2020 for developing
economies.  At Subic  Bay  in 1996,  APEC  entered  its action  phase  with  the adoption  of the Manila
Actin  Plan  for APEC  (MAPA).  The  three  pillars  of the MAPA  are Individual  Action  Plans  (IAPs),
Collective  Action  (CAPs),  and Joint  Activities  in  Economic  and  Technical  Cooperation.  The IAPs
are voluntary  submissions  of unilateral  liberalization  initiatives  by member  economies.  The CAPs
are the collective  action  plans which  are agreed  upon  through  the process  of consensus.  The third
component  of the MAPA  is based  on the principle  that  trade and  investment  liberalization  and
facilitation  should  be supported  and complemented  by economic  and  technical  cooperation
(Manila  Action  Plan  for APEC,  1996).
35'Experimental  Design
Scenario  1 (AFTAl): Inclusion  List (IL) and Temporary  Exclusion  List (TEL) liberalization
under  AFTA  (2003  for ASEAN  5 and 2006  for Vietnam). Vietnam  liberalizes  the items  in the IL
and TEL. ASEAN-5  members  reciprocate  the concessions.
Scenario  2 (AFTA2):  Scenario  1 plus Sensitive  List (SL)  liberalization  (2010  for ASEAN  5 and
2013 for Vietnam).  Vietnam  liberalizes  the items in the IL, TEL, SL and ASEAN-5  members
reciprocate  the concessions.
Scenario 3 (AFTA3): Scenario  2 plus General  Exception  List (GEL) liberalization.  Vietnam
liberalizes,  as a counterfactual,  the items  in the IL, TEL, SL and GEL. The ASEAN-5  members
reciprocate  the concessions.
Scenario 4  (UNILATERAL): Scenario 3  plus  unilateral tariff  reduction on  a  non-
discriminatory  basis. We investigate  what happens  if Vietnam  extends  its AFTA concessions  to
the  rest of the world. We assume  that the other  APEC  members  maintain  the current  protections.
Scenario  5 (APEC): All the APEC members, including Vietnam, reduce their tariff rates
unilaterally  to 2.5 percent  on a non-discriminatory  basis.
V. 4. Results
1) Direction of Trade
Annex Tables 5A and 5B show how the directions of trade change with the AFTA
and APEC  simulations.  When Vietnam  liberalizes  the Inclusion List  (IL) and  the
Temporary Exclusion List (TEL), its imports from ASEAN increase whereas imports
from the rest of the world decrease. Imports from Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines,
Singapore, and Thailand increase by 26 percent, 50 percent, 19 percent, 24 percent and 60
percent respectively.  On the export side (Anniex 5B), exports to ASEAN increase with
the  exception of  Singapore whereas  the export values  to  the  rest  of  the  world  are
relatively unchanged. Increases in exports to Thailand are especially high registering a 97
36percent increase because of the substantial tariff cuts given by Thailand on its imports
from Vietnam. In contrast, exports to Singapore are unchanged since the initial tariff rates
of Singapore are close to zero.
The  second tables in  Annex  5-A and Annex  5-B refer  to  the results  of the
Sensitive  List  (agricultural  goods)  liberalization  in  addition  to  the  IL  and  TEL
liberalization. Whereas the  SL  liberalization affects the  import  side  relatively little,
exports to Malaysia and the Philippines increase substantially. This is because Malaysia
and the Philippines included some important items such as processed rice in the Sensitive
List (SL).
The third set of tables demonstrates the results of General Exception List (GEL)
liberalization in addition to the IL, TEL, and the SL liberalizations. In principle, products
in the GEL are permanently excluded from the CEPT scheme.  However, since Vietnam
included a range of commodities that goes far beyond the usual interpretation of this
category, such as alcoholic beverages, motorcars, motorcycles and petroleum products, a
simulation was conducted to test, as a counterfactual, what happens if Vietnam liberalizes
the products in the GEL.  Imports from Singapore and Thailand increase substantially
from $2069 to $2461 million for Singapore and $795 to $1130 million for Thailand. The
increase in imports of beverage and tobacco (BTP) and petroleum products (PCP) from
Singapore and increase in imports of transport equipment (TRP) from Thailand contribute
to these changes.  On the export side, the liberalization of GEL affects the exports to
ASEAN relatively little since the products in the GEL are not export-oriented products.
However, overall exports increase in order to finance increased imports.
37The fourth set of tables in Annex 5-A and B (Scenario 4) shows what happens if
Vietnam liberalizes all the lists under AFTA and then extends the same liberalization to
the rest of the world.  Imports are now sourced from a wider variety of countries and
exports to EU15 and Japan increase noticeably relative to AFTA liberalization.  These
owe mainly to the increase in  clothing sector which  increases by 85 percent  and 83
percent respectively.  This is perhaps because of increased access to cheaper imports of
raw materials, as shown in increases in imports in textiles from China, NIEs and Japan,
will lower the cost of clothing production.
2) Effects on Outputs
Unilateral liberalization has two offsetting effects on output levels.  On the one
hand, reductions in the costs of intermediate inputs create beneficial forward linkages to
domestic production and promote industrialization  (Puga and Venables, 1998). On the
other hand, more intense import competition has an adverse effect on the profitability of
import-competing firms. Table 5 refers to the effects on output.
Table 5. The Effects on  ____  __
Scenario 1  Scenario 2  Scenario 3  Scenario 4  Scenauio  5
AFTA 1  AFTA 2  AFTA 3  Unilateral  APEC
(%)  (%)  (%)  (%)  (%)
AGR  Agriculture and forestry  -0.1  0.2  0.3  -1.9  -4
PAG  Processed agriculture  -1.2  7.8  8.7  2.5  -22.7
BTP  Beverage and tobacco  -0.1  -1  -47.0  -55.0  -53.8
COG  Coal, oil, gas  -0.1  -0.3  1.4  0.5  1.2
PCP  Petroleumproducts  5  5  5.8  7.1  13.8
TEX  Textiles  2.6  0.2  1.7  10.3  16.4
CLO  Apparel  10.1  6.9  7.9  75.4  83.9
LMF  Lightmanufacturing  4.2  1.9  3.3  15.6  28
BMF  Basic manufacturing  -3.6  -4.6  -3.7  -12.8  -10.9
CRP  Chemical, rubber, plastics  -0.4  -1  -1.0  -2.6  0.1
TRP  Transport equipment  -0.8  -2.6  -31.5  -48.1  -54.2
MCE  Electronics and machinery  -3.6  -4.7  -2.8  -7.5  -5.2
Source: Authors' Simulation  Results (qo)
38The outputs  of  agriculture, forestry (AGR),  and processed  agriculture (PAG)
increase with AFTA liberalization, especially with the Sensitive List (SL) liberalization,
whereas the outputs of these sectors decrease when Vietnam extends the concession to
the rest of the world.  In particular, the decrease in output of processed agriculture (PAG)
by 23 percent under APEC liberalization is worth noting.20 This appears to be because
agricultural processing industries in many countries were adversely affected by protection
on their raw agricultural inputs. With widespread liberalization, agricultural processing in
these countries expands, placing competitive pressure on the agricultural processing in
Vietnam.  As the profitability of agricultural processing falls in  Vietnam due  to the
increasing competition, Vietnamese labor and other resources move to  the now more
profitable labor  intensive  sectors  such  as  clothing  and  light  manufacturing, whose
expansion is stimulated by the increased market access to the APEC countries.
There is very substantial expansion of apparel industry particularly when Vietnam
liberalizes against the rest of the world either unilaterally or in the APEC.  This is partly
because low cost intermediates resulting from import liberalization lowers the cost of
production 2l; partly because Vietnam has a clear comparative advantage in  the labor-
intensive sectors against non-ASEAN countries whereas its competitive position for these
commodities is less clear within ASEAN.
20 Since  the APEC  scenario  is hypothetical,  the results  should  not be considered  as rigorous  estimates.
However,  the results  shed  some  lights  on the qualitative  assessments  of the APEC  liberalization.  On
the one  hand,  the APEC-wide  liberalization  introduces  competition  in Vietnam's  exports. On the
other hand, Vietnam is likely to benefit from the increased access to the APEC markets.
21 Currently,  Vietnam's textile and garment industry has to import most of raw materials from abroad.
However, this result is likely to be overestimating the magnitude of expansion since many firms
benefit from duty drawback system.
39In contrast, the outputs of some import competing sectors are likely to contract
due to increasing competition. In particular, transport equipment (TRP) and beverage and
tobacco sectors (BTP) contract if Vietnam liberalizes those items currently in the GEL of
the CEPT Scheme (scenario 3) and further contracts if Vietnam liberalizes against the rest
of the world.  The impacts on the basic manufacturing (BMF) 22 appear to be relatively
small under AFTA whereas the production contracts further with  a non-discriminatory
liberalization.
3) The Effects on Factor Returns
A regional integration makes trade easier and hence tends to raise the returns to at
least some factors of production (Winters, 1996). A simple application of the Heckscher-
Ohlin model might lead us to expect Vietnam's returns to capital to fall since Vietnam is
capital-scarce relative to its ASEAN partner countries.  Since international trade tends to
increase the returns to the abundant factor and reduce those to the scarce factor, assuming
protection against capital intensive goods from ASEAN, increased trade with ASEAN
might be expected to reduce the returns to capital in the new members. However, there is
a number of reasons to believe that the basic Heckscher-Ohlin model is too simple for our
purposes and one might expect ASEAN to raise the rates of returns on capital in both
partners regardless of capital abundance.
First,  the standard Heckscher-Ohlin model  applies only to  a  so-called  square
model with equal numbers of factors of production and goods; and there is no indication
22  Some important industries such as cement, paper, and steel, belong to this category. However, caution
should  be bome in mind to interpret this result since our simulation does not include protective effects
of quantitative restrictions. For these industries, the main protection measures are nontariffs such as
quota and market entry.
40that this is the way the real world is. The GTAP 4 database identifies five factors of
production: land, unskilled labor, skilled labor, capital, and natural resources and up to 50
commodities.  Second, the Heckscher-Ohlin model presumes homogeneous products,
whereas experience suggests that many markets are better represented by differentiated
products and intra-industry trade. The GTAP model assumes the so-called Armington
assumption with the goods being differentiated by country of origin. In addition, the
substitutability of domestic  and  foreign goods also becomes very  important.  Third,
integration might affect the rate of return on capital through the price of intermediate and
capital goods.  A reduction in tariffs and trading costs on imports of capital equipment
will reduce the prices which industry has to pay for investment goods (The model does
not capture this effect directly because the total stock of capital in each country is fixed in
these simulations).
Table 6 shows the simulation results of the changes in returns to the factors of
production.  The measure reported reflects the changes in  factor prices relative to the
price index for private consumption expenditure. It does not, however, take into account
the  effects of  changes in the revenue position of the  government, and  its  ability to
redistribute tax revenues to individuals, either through transfers or the provision of public
goods.
Table 6. Real Returns to Factors of Production
Scenario  1  Scenario  2  Scenario  3  Scenario  5  Scenario  6
AFTA 1  AFTA  2  AFTA  3  Unilateral  APEC
(%)  (%)  (%)  (%)  (%)
Land  1.9  4.0  9.9  2.9  -8.3
Unskilled  Labor  2.3  2.7  8.0  16.1  17.2
Skilled  Labor  2.0  2.4  7.7  15.4  17.7
Capital  2.0  2.4  7.2  14.3  16.0
Capital  2.0  2.4  7.2  14.3  16.0
Source:  Authors' Simulation  Results  (pfactreal)
41AFTA raises real wages for both skilled and unskilled labor as well as the return
to capital.  The magnitude of increases more than doubles when Vietnam extends its
liberalization against  the rest  of  ithe world.  Returns  to  land increase  under  AFTA
liberalization  whereas  its  return  decreases  with  non-discriminatory  liberalization.
Again, this is because Vietnam has a comparative advantage in  agriculture among the
ASEAN countries.  With further liberalization vvith  the rest of the world, since land is a
sector specific and labor is spectrally mobile, a portion of labor appear to shift from the
agricultural  sector  to  industrial  sectors.  In  sum,  a  wider  scope  of  Vietnam's
liberalization is likely to induce Vietnam's industrialization.
4) Terms of Trade
The terms of trade, which is usually defined as the ratio of the region's  export
price to import price,  is a key concept in  evaluating the  effects of price  changes on
welfare.  The reciprocal liberalization involved in AFTA leads to two offsetting effects.
(i) Liberalization of Vietnam's imports reduces costs in Vietnam and hence increases its
supply into world markets.  This, in turn, can be expected to reduce the prices received
for exports per unit. (ii) As its AFTA partners reduce their tariffs on Vietnamese exports,
their demands for Vietnamese exports rise, and this in turn improves Vietnamese export
prices (see Figure 5C-1,2).  The nel effect depends on which effect is larger.  Table 7
demonstrates the effects on the terms of trade. 23 Table 7 implies that Vietnam's terms of
23 We follow McDougall (1993) to decompose  the impact  of terms of trade  into  three  components:  the
worldprice effect (1), the exportprice effect (2), and the importprice  effect (3).
Terms of Trade
42trade deteriorate primarily through changes in  its export prices with the exception of
scenario 2.  Most of the terms of trade deterioration results  from  falls in  the prices
received for exports, but a part results from increases in the prices of imports.  The larger
magnitude in  change  in  export prices  relative  to  import  prices  is  related  to  the
assumption of the product differentiation by  country of  origin  (e.g. Vietnamese rice,
Japanese cars) on the demand side, a standard feature of the Armington (1969) model.
With the standard GTAP elasticities of substitution that we have used in this  paper,
increases in Vietnam's export supplies require falls in the prices of Vietnamese exports if
Vietnam is to increase its export share. On the import side, Vietnam faces highly elastic
export supplies curves because of its small size of the economy. Thus, Vietnam needs to
pay higher prices for its imports only to the extent that it is a relatively large importer
from world markets.
The improvement in  the terms of trade in  scenario 2 reflects the increases in
export  prices  resulting  from  the  ASEAN  partners'  concessions  against  Vietnam's
T = EAT 1I + ZAT2 - AT 3 j
(1) World  Price  Effect: AT,  = (sXi-  Smd  * (P.,  - Pd
(2)  Export  Price  Effect:  AT 2 = S,  * (Px,  -Pwi)
(3)  Import  Price  Effect:  4T3j  Smi*  (pmj  -pw,)
The  world  price effect  (1) equals  the sum over all traded  commodities  of a country's  net trade share (the
difference  between  export and import shares)  for good i (S&  - Smj and the change  in the price of i (Pwd
relative  to an index of average  world prices (Pw,  - Pj).  In a perfect  substitute  model, (1) would  fully
account  for the change  in terms of trade since  each  cormnodity  has a single  world  price. In an imperfect
substitute  model, changes  in terms of trade can also arise from changes  in the relative  prices of different
source-specific  varieties  of the same commodity. The  export  price effect (2) refers to the sum of export
share-weighted,  relative price changes,  where  the relative  price in question  is the ratio of the exporter's
price  for commodity  i (Pd)  relative  to the worldwide  average  (pd). The degree  to which  these  two  prices  can
diverge  is a function  of the extent  of product  differentiation  in market  i.  The import  price effect  (3) is the
import  share-weighted  change  in the country  specific  price index (Pw) relative  to the average  world  price
(P.d-.
43agricultural commodities, which are particularly important for Vietnam given its revealed
comparative advantage in agriculture within ASEAN.
Table 7. The Effects of Terms of Trade
Scenario  1  Scenario  2  Scenario  3  Scenario  4  Scenario  5
AFTA 1  AFTA  2  AFTA  3  Unilateral  APEC
(%)  (%)  (%)  (%)  (%)
World  Price  Effect  0.00  0.00  0.00  -0.01  0.01
Export  Price  Effect  -0.2  0.4  -0.4  -0.7  -2.6
Import  Price  Effect  0.02  0.02  0.05  0.02  -1.1
Total TOT Effects  -0.2  0.4  -0.4  -0.7  -1.5
Source: Authors'  Simulation  Results  (cI r, c2 r, c3 r, tot2)
In contrast, the terms of trade impacts are negative under  scenario 3, because
Vietnam gains very little from improved access for these products to partner countries, its
increased exports tend to  depress its export returns, and it must pay  higher prices to
source more imports from its  ASEIAN  partners as Vietnam increases its  demand for
imports from these countries alone.
Under  Unilateral  liberalization,  the  deterioration  in  the  export  prices  of
Vietnamese  goods  is  larger  than  under  the  AFTA  liberalization  scenarios because
Vietnam is liberalizing more, and hence increasing its competitiveness and exports by
more than under the AFTA scenario.  The decline in prices is likely to be particularly
large relative to  world prices for  commodities in which  Vietnam greatly expands its
export volumes.
5) Economywide Effects
Table 8 presents the key results for some important economy-wide variables.
As  the scope of liberalization widens from partial AFTA to non-discriminatory, both
imports and exports increase.  With scenario 2, Vietnam's imports and exports increase
by 3.1 percent and 3.9 percent respectively.  The magnitude of increase in trade value is
44the highest with the non-discriminatory liberalization (scenario 4) which implies  12.8
percent increase in imports and a 15.2 percent increase in exports.  The increases in the
value of trade as we move from scenario 1 to  scenario 4 in Table 8 reflect favorable
impacts of increases in export volumes, and unfavorable impacts of declines in export
pnces24 as  export volumes  increase-clearly,  the  export  volume  impacts  dominate
overall.  However, values of trade under APEC (scenario 5) decrease slightly relative to
scenario 4,  reflecting falling prices.  The increase in  export volumes, which  is more
relevant than values to  the  question of  employment in  the export  sector, would be
substantially  greater  at  13.6  percent  (not  reported)  under  APEC  than  unilateral
liberalization at 12.7 percent.
Table 8. Key Economywide Varables for Vietnam
Scenario  1  Scenario  2  Scenario  3  Scenario  4  Scenario  5
AFTA  1  AFTA  2  AFTA  3  Unilateral  APEC
Total  Import  Value(%)  3.1  3.4  6.3  12.8  11.7
FromASEAN  32.8  33.4  63.3  22.8  27.0
FromROW  -12.3  -12.1  -23.1  7.5  3.9
Total Export  Value  (%)  3.9  4.7  7.2  15.2  12.7
To ASEAN  13.8  33.6  36.9  33.8  -2.6
ToROW  2.3  0.1  2.5  12.2  15.2
Tariff  Revenue  (%)  -18.0  -17.8  -56.0  -82.4  -84.7
Real Expenditure  (%)  0.02  0.4  -0.04  1.4  1.3
Total EV ($mil.)  of which  2.1  51.3  -5.6  191.6  180.3
Allocative Component  19.2  21.7  26.6  251.0  293.3
Terms of Trade Component  -17.1  29.6  -32.3  -59.4  -113.0
Source: Authors' Simulation results (VIW, CNTalleffr, CNTtotr)
24 Throughout this analysis, we have utilized the default values of the Armington trade elasticities from the
GTAP database. There is considerable evidence that these values are too low for long-run simulations
such as  those undertaken here,  and many simulations of  long run  liberalization (see  Martin and
Winters 1996, for example) utilize substantially  higher values, which result in much smaller terms of
trade deteriorations when countries liberalize.
45On the import side, liberaliz;ation  directly stimulates increases in imports of those
goods subject to liberalization. Where liberalization is discriminatory, as is the case with
AFTA, part of the increase in imports from partner countries is offset by reductions in
imports from other countries (trade diversion).  For instance, under scenario 2, which is
the current scenario under AFTA, imports from ASEAN increase by 33.4 percent, while
imports from the rest of the world decrease by 12.1 percent.  Larger increases in imports
from ASEAN relative to the rest of the world under non-discriminatory liberalization
(scenario 4) may reflect the higher initial tariff rates against ASEAN  imports. 25 The
broader the geographic coverage of import liberalization, the greater the overall stimulus
to imports (trade creation), and the greater the associated stimulus to exports.  Under the
APEC liberalization scenario, expoits to the rest of the world increase by  15.2 percent
whereas those to ASEAN decrease slightly.  This is due to the increased market access
resulting from the liberalization by the APEC countries whereas the gains from market
access within ASEAN are relatively small because of the dominance of Singapore in
Vietnam's exports.
There are losses of tariff revenue ranging from 18.0 percent in scenario 2 to 82.4
percent in scenario 4.  The loss of tariff revenues is smaller in scenario 2 than in scenario
3 since the increased imports financed by increased exports outweigh the loss resulting
from tariff reduction.  The change in tariff revenues under discriminatory liberalization
25 While  the tariff rates are the same  at the tariff line level, the weighted  averages  differ because  of the
differences  in the mix of imports  in each commodity  group. The higher initial tariff rates against
ASEAN  countries  imply  that the commodity  comnposition  sourced  from ASEAN  consists  of the items
with  relatively  high tariff  rates.  Average  tariffs  differ between  ASEAN  and the rest of the world,
with  duties  on imports  form ASEAN  averaging  24.3  percent as against  16.5 percent  from the rest of
the world.
46has three components. These are (i) a loss of revenues resulting from the fall in rates on
the goods liberalized; (ii) a gain from increases in the volumes of liberalized imports; and
(iii)  a  loss of  revenues from  reductions in  the  volumes of  import  flows not  being
liberalized. The third loss reflects the problem of trade diversion and is frequently critical
to the welfare impacts of discriminatory liberalization.
The overall welfare effects presented in Table 8 reflect primarily the consequences
of the allocative efficiency effects of liberalization and trade diversion, and terms of trade
effects.  In scenario 1, the overall welfare gain is close to zero since the gains resulting
from increased trade with the ASEAN partner countries are offset by the trade diversion
from the rest of the world, which causes a loss of tariff revenues. The net welfare gain
from  the  regional  liberalization  is  more  or  less  completely  offset  by  the  overall
deterioration in the terms of trade.
Under scenario 2, Vietnam's real expenditure increases by $51.3 million per year,
or 0.4 percent of base-period expenditure. This gain is primarily attributed to the terms of
trade gains against Vietnam's agricultural goods resulting from the concession given by
ASEAN partner countries.
Under scenario 3, the net welfare gains are very slightly negative.  The net gains
in allocative efficiency resulting from the regional liberalization are very small because of
the trade diversion towards ASEAN partners. The negative terms of trade impacts more
or less completely outweigh the positive allocative effects.
Under scenarios 4 and 5, real expenditure increases substantially by 1.4 percent
and 1.3 percentage points from the baseline, more than tripling the real gains from AFTA
liberalization.  Although Vietnam experiences larger terms of trade deterioration in its
47exports, the loss is far outweighed by the improved resource allocation impacts. Part of
this is because these types of unilateral liberalization unwind the welfare losses arising
from trade diversion created by the regional arrangement. Following these unilateral
liberalizations, Vietnamese firms can choose to source from lower cost suppliers than
those available in the ASEAN group.  Part of this is because available resources are more
efficiently used among different industries.
Allocative efficiency is the highest under scenario 5.  Since tariff reductions are
nondiscriminatory under APEC, there can be nc, trade diversion. However, the welfare
level is slightly lower relative to scenario 4 due to the deteriorating terms of trade.
VI. ConcludinL  Remarks
AFTA is an important initial step for Vietnam's further liberalization.  Under it,
Vietnamn  must commit to a tariff reduction schedule at the tariff line level and starts to
identify and eliminate quantitative r  estrictions.  This process involves harmonizing tariff
nomenclature,  improving legal  and  regulatory  frameworks, and  facing  the needs  of
increasing competitiveness of its  industries.  AFTA is a  useful training ground for
Vietnam's integration into a global economy.
However, our simulation results showed that the static economy-wide effects of
AFTA liberalization currently committed to by Vietnam are relatively small. There are
several important reasons for this. On the import side, the share of imports from AFTA
partners is  currently relatively small, and  the initial  extent of  liberalization  of these
imports is also limited.  In addition, the gains from trade creation are offset by the costly
trade diversion resulting in the form of loss of tariff revenue from non-ASEAN countries.
On the export side, the dominance of Singapore in Vietnam's ASEAN exports implies
48relatively  small  gains  from  the increase  in  market  access, since  Singapore's  initial
protection is  already close to  zero.  Further, the standard GTAP model used in  the
analysis suggests that  there may be  significant terms of trade losses from the export
expansion associated with the AFTA liberalization.
All  of  above  suggests that  it  is beneficial  for  Vietnam  to  extend  its  AFTA
concession on an MFN base.  When Vietnam extends its AFTA comnitments  to all of its
trading partners, Vietnam's welfare increases substantially. These gains are larger in part
because  of  the  greater  extent  of  liberalization,  and  in  part  because  the  broader
liberalization undoes  the costly trade  diversion created by the  initial, discriminatory,
liberalization,  and  finally  due  to  the  more  efficient  allocation  of  resources  among
Vietnam's industries.
The simulation results  reveal that AFTA,  unilateral and APEC  liberalizations
affect Vietnam's industries in different ways.  AFTA appears to have beneficial impacts
on  Vietnam's  agriculture  resulting  from  the  increasing  access  to  ASEAN  market,
especially with the Sensitive List (SL) liberalization. In contrast, a broader liberalization
beyond AFTA is likely to cause a shift of labor from agriculture and a  set of import
competing activities towards relatively labor-intensive manufacturing.  These sectors
conform to Vietnam's  current comparative advantage and taking this step now seems a
promising way to  facilitate the subsequent development of competitive firms in more
capital and skill intensive sectors.
In contrast, some import competing industries, including transport equipment and
beverages,  tend  to  contract with  wider  liberalization,  revealing  the  dependance on
protection of  these  industries. Whether or  not  to  protect  so-called key  industries is
49controversial. If the gains from 'learning by doing' in these industries are high enough,
then such an import substitution policy might increase growth rates even while foregoing
some of the gains from comparative advantage.  However, as the experience of some
Asian  countries revealed in the recent financial crises, the industries developed behind
high  protective  barriers and  vested  interests tend  to  remain  inefficient  and  impose
substantial costs to the economy.
Despite substantial progress since Doi Moi, Vietnam remains one of the most
distorted economies in the region. T'he  state sector still enjoys various forms of privileges
including access to land, capital, and quota allocations. In particular, import substitution
policy has been applied to promote a  set of capital-intensive and  strategic industries,
which  are  often run  by joint  ventures  between  SOEs  and  foreign firms,  and  high
protection is  used  to  attract  foreign investments.  Preferential treatments  of  these
industries impose implicit tax on s-mall  and medium private sectors, which are usually
labor-intensive. Vietnam appears to employ a set of export promotion measures such as
duty  drawback system to  mitigate  negative effects  of  protection  on  export  sectors.
However, a system of high tariffs and deep exemptions tends to stimulate exports from
assembly-type operations, rather than from sectors with  strong forward and backward
linkages to other domestic sectors.  Binding international commitments in AFTA and, in
due course, at the WTO, provide a, credible signal of Vietnam's  commitment to  open
trade policies that will help  stimulate upgrading of  existing firms  and investment in
efficient and dynamic new firms.
Industrialization and modernization should be built on the development of the
skills needed for modem industrial development and on the improvement of physical and
50institutional infrastructures. The opportunity for Vietnam to expand the labor-intensive
manufacturing sectors that so well match its current pattern of factor endowments may be
an important step on the ladder of development.  This step provides a platform for the
progressive development of more capital and skill intensive sectors as  long as sufficient
attention is paid to the accumulation of the human and physical capital needed for the
expansion of these sectors.
Finally, the multi-region and multi-sector modeling framework adopted in this
study has  proved  to  be  a  useful  tool  to  assess  the  simultaneous  impacts  of  trade
liberalization by Vietnam and its trading partners on trade, output, and welfare. However,
the model is subject to a number of limitations.  First, the model is static and it does not
take into account the dynamic effects of trade liberalization which would occur during the
phase-in period. 26 Second, we did not address the protective effects of Non Tariff
Barriers (NTBs) for want of adequate information on their restrictiveness.  If NTBs were
incorporated in the model, the magnitude of consequences of trade liberalization would
be larger.  Third, we have not been able, to date, to analyze the set of export promotion
measures such as the duty drawback system which coexist with the import protection.
26 For the survey  of potential  dynamic  benefits  of ASEAN/AFTA  Accession,  see Fukase  and Winters
(1999).
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55Annex 1. Revealed Comparative Advantage for ASEAN 10 (1990-1995 Average)
SITC  Description  Brunei  IndoneE;ia  Cambodia  Lao  Malaysia  Myanmar  Philippines  Singapore  Thailand  Vietnam
PDR
0  LIVE ANIMALS  0.0  0.0  0.0  1.3  1.8  0.2  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.0
I  MEAT AND PREPARATIONS  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  1.4  0.1
2  DAIRY PRODUCTS AND EGGS  0.0  0.3  0.0  0.0  0.3  0.0  0.0  0.2  0.1  0.8
3  FISH AND PREPARATIONS  0.0  3.4  1.6  0.1  0.7  9.5  3.7  0.5  8.7  11.3
4  CEREALS AND PREPARATIONS  0.0  0.1  0.6  0.1  0.2  3.3  0.1  0.2  3.3  6.6
(Of which 42 RICE)  0.0  0.3  0.0  0.0  0.0.  27.6  0.2  0.1  28.7  69.7
5  FRUIT AND VEGETABLES  0.0  0.6  0.1  0.2  0.3  8.3  4.5  0.1  3.1  1.5
6  SUGARAND PREPS HONEY  0.0  0.5  0.0  0.0  0.5  0.5  3.3  0.1  7.0  0.8
7  COFFEE TEA COCOA SPICES  0.0  4.8  1.2  7.0  1.3  1.7  0.4  0.6  0.8  9.2
(Of which 71 COFFEE)  0.0  5.2  0.0  14.9  0.0  0.1  0.3  0.1  1.2  16.9
8  ANIMAL  FEEDING STUFF  0.0  1.0  0.0  0.0  0.6  1.4  1.3  0.2  1.6  0.1
11  BEVERAGES  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.1  0.3  0.1  0.1
12  TOBACCO AND MFRS  0.0  0.8  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.1  1.0  0.4  0.8  0.1
21  HIDES,SKINS,FURS  UNDRSSD  0.0  0.1  3.3  4.1  0.1  1.9  0.0  0.0  0.1  2.7
22  OIL SEEDS,NUTS,KERNELS  0.0  0.1  7.6  0.5  0.1  16.7  0.5  0.1  0.1  7.0
23  RUBBERCRUDE,SYNTHETIC  0.0  12.1.  64.5  0.0  10.8  7.5  0.5  1.8  14.2  3.4
24  WOOD LUMBER AND CORK  0.0  2.4  48.0  53.9  9.2  45.4  0.7  0.3  0.2  3.6
25  PULP AND WASTE PAPER  0.0  0.6  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.5  0.2  0.1  0.0
26  TEXTILE  FIBRES  0.0  0.2  1.9  0.1  0.3  0.3  0.4  0.1  0.7  0.7
(OF WHICH 261 SILK)  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.2  0.9  9.2
27  CRUDE FERTLZR,MINRLS  NES  0.0  0.3  0.0  0.3  0.3  0.1  0.4  0.2  1.2  0.3
28  METALLIFEROUS  ORES,SCRAP  0.1  2.8  2.8  3.9  0.4  1.7  3.8  0.4  0.1  1.0
29  CRUDEANIMAL,VEGMATNES  0.0  0.5  2.3  3.4  0.3  2.4  1.2  0.5  1.4  3.1
32  COAL,COKE,BRIQUETTES  0.0  3.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  4.1
33  PETROLEUM  AND PRODUCTS  6.4  2.6  0.0  0.0  1.1  0.1  0.1  1.9  0.1  2.9
34  GAS NATURAL  AND MANUFCTD  40.3  14.4  0.0  0.0  3.0  0.0  0.7  0.2  0.0  0.0
41  ANIMAL  OILS AND FATS  0.0  0.6  0.0  0.0  1.2  0.0  0.3  0.2  0.0  0.0
42  FIXEDVEGETABLEOIL,FAT  0.0  6.2  0.0  0.0  15.2  0.0  11.6  1.7  0.1  0.8
43  PROCESDANMLVEGOIL,ETC  0.0  2.7  0.0  0.0  16.2  0.0  3.6  1.5  0.7  0.0
51  CHEM ELEMENTS,COMPOUNDS  0.0  0.3  0.0  0.1  0.2  0.1  0.2  0.8  0.1  0.0
52  COAL,PETROLEUM  ETC CHEMS  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.6  0.0  0.0  4.0  0.1  0.0
53  DYES,TANNING,COLOUR  PROD  0.0  0.2  0.0  0.0  0.2  0.1  0.0  0.7  0.3  0.0
54  MEDICINAL  ETC PRODUCTS  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.1  0.3  0.1  0.0
55  PERFUME,CLEANING  ETC PRD  0.0  0.4  0.0  0.0  0.4  0.0  0.2  0.5  0.3  0.3
56  FERTLIZERS MANUFACTURED  0.0  1.1  0.0  0.0  0.4  0.0  1.5  0.1  0.0  0.1
57  EXPLOSIVES,PYROTECH  PROD  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.2  0.0  1.5  0.1  0.1  0.0
58  PLASTIC MATERIALS  ETC  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.2  0.0  0.1  0.7  0.3  0.1
61  LEATHER,DRESSED  FUR,ETC  0.0  0.6  0.0  0.9  0.1  0.3  0.3  0.1  2.0  0.4
62  RUBBER MANUFACTURES  NES  0.0  0.4  0.2  0.0  0.8  0.0  0.2  0.3  0.9  1.3
63  WOOD,CORKMANUFACTRS  0.0  18.5  0.0  3.6  3.6  0.9  2.0  0.6  1.1  1.1
64  PAPER,PAPERBOARD  AND MFR  0.0  0.5  0.0  0.0  0.2  0.0  0.1  0.3  0.2  0.1
65  TEXTILE  YARN,FABRIC ETC  0.0  1.6  0.1  0.1  0.4  0.0  0.4  0.2  1.2  1.8
66  NONMETAL  MINERAL MFS NES  0.1  0.4  0.0  0.0  0.4  3.4  0.4  0.2  1.9  0.4
67  IRON AND STEEL  0.0  0.2  0.0  0.3  0.2  0.1  0.1  0.2  0.2  0.7
68  NON-FERROUS METALS  0.0  0.6  0.0  0.0  0.4  0.2  1.1  0.3  0.1  0.4
69  METAL MANUFACTURES  NES  0.0  0.3  0.0  0.0  0.4  0.0  0.3  0.6  0.6  0.3
71  MACHINERY,NON-ELECTRIC  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.7  0.1  0.5  2.2  1.0  0.1
72  ELECTRICAL  MACHINERY  0.0  0.2  0.0  0.0  2.9  0.0  2.5  2.4  1.3  0.1
73  TRANSPORT  EQUIPMENT  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.1  0.2  0.1  0.1
81  PLUMBG,HEATNG,LGHTNG  EQU  0.0  0.2  0.0  0.0  0.3  0.0  0.9  0.2  0.8  0.1
82  FURNITURE  0.0  2.0  0.1  0.2  0.9  0.1  2.2  0.4  1.8  0.9
83  TRAVEL GOODS,HANDBAGS  0.0  0.5  0.5  0.1  0.2  0.0  2.0  0.1  2.8  3.5
84  CLOTHING  0.4  2.1  4.8  8.1  1.4  1.5  4.4  0.5  2.2  3.1
85  FOOTWEAR  0.0  4.6  0.1  0.1  0.3  0.1  1.5  0.1  2.9  4.0
86  INSTRMNTS,WATCHES,CLOCKS  0.7  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.6  0.0  1.0  0.8  0.7  0.1
89  MISC MANUFCTRD GOODS NES  2.0  0.4  0.1  0.1  1.4  0.1  1.0  1.2  1.9  0.3
93  SPECIAL TRANSACTIONS  0.4  0.1  2.6  0.3  0.6  0.2  0.6  1.0  0.5  0.2
94  ZOO ANIMALS,PETS  0.0  3.5  0.0  0.0  0.6  2.9  3.5  0.5  1.2  1.9
95  WAR FIREARMS,AMMUNITION  0.4  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.2  0.0  0.0
Source: UN Comtrade System
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Cambodia  Indonesia  Malaysia  Philippines  Lao PDR  Thailand  Vietnam
Section  HS  Description  Simple  Wightwd  SrmIe  Weighted  Sinvle  W6ightd  Simbo  Wdghted  Sirmpe  Weighted  Sin.ie  Wdightd  Simnl.  Weisht.d
AveraR/.&)  Avmgd%-  MmmeN%) Averayd(/)  Avragd(%)  A-raze(%)  Averaze(%) Avffag-/.)  Averay(dY)  AveraRe(%) Averze%)  AvcraR-/.)  Avera/.)  AverazdYs)
1  1-5  Animals&animalproducts  10.2  6.7  15.9  10.8  8.9  1.7  23.6  14.2  13.9  7.1  39.4  34.2  11.5  13.7
2  6-14  Vegetable products  14.3  9.0  12.2  3.6  2.3  3.1  22.1  37.6  22.7  13.0  30.4  13.3  17.2  11.5
3  15  Animal&Vegetableoils  6.1  5.6  8.3  3.8  1.6  0.7  20.4  17.7  10.7  10.1  17.4  16.1  12.1  19.5
4  16-24  Processed foods, drinks & tobacco  28.5  28.3  26.6  5.6  6.4  3.0  26.7  21.1  24.5  30.7  38.2  23.5  34.0  43.6
5  25-27  Oil and minerals products  10.4  21.5  4.6  3.1  1.9  1.1  4.7  8.0  5.1  5.0  10.8  5.7  4.3  41.2
6  28-38  Chemical products  10.8  6.7  6.4  5.3  1.1  1.2  6.4  7.5  8.9  10.5  15.8  14.7  5.2  5.1
7  39-40  Plastic&rubberproducts  11.7  10.6  15.6  14.9  12.4  9.7  13.5  13.9  11.7  12.1  31.1  28.0  9.5  8.5
8  41-43  Skins&furs  and theirproducts  22.5  27.5  10.7  0.9  4.0  2.5  18.4  19.8  12.2  13.7  27.4  8.3  11.6  6.2
9  44-46  Wood&woodproducts  28.8  28.4  10.6  5.3  16.1  18.9  20.9  15.0  27.6  31.0  21.6  9.2  16.1  9.7
10  47-49  Pulpofwood&paper  5.4  5.6  9.3  5.8  8.9  6.8  15.5  14.3  7.4  8.8  23.4  14.6  16.2  19.0
11.1  50-60  Textiles  15.1  13.2  17.4  9.6  10.5  10.0  16.2  15.4  9.2  9.5  28.1  20.0  23.3  27.8
11.2  61-63  Apparel  20.7  12.5  27.8  28.2  14.2  11.9  27.4  27.1  10.7  10.3  45.0  42.3  48.9  46.3
12  64-67  Shoes, hats, umbrellas, etc.  19.8  10.3  21.9  15.7  13.1  15.7  29.5  23.7  12.1  10.1  43.6  37.3  40.5  21.9
13  68-70  Stone,ceramic&glassproducts  11.7  7.6  10.2  7.0  10.0  7.2  20.1  19.2  5.9  5.2  39.9  29.5  22.9  28.6
14  71  Jewelry & precious metal products  22.2  0.0  12.0  8.4  3.5  0.3  8.0  3.6  5.0  5.0  17.3  2.0  16.7  6.3
15  72-83  Base metals & their products  12.6  6.7  9.8  6.3  5.0  5.6  14.4  12.8  5.9  5.9  15.7  9.6  9.2  9.2
16  84-85  Electrical &mechanical equipment  13.8  11.8  5.5  4.9  4.0  2.1  8.5  5.7  6.8  7.7  12.6  11.7  6.4  9.1
17  86-89  Transport equipment  22.8  21.6  25.6  26.0  11.3  9.5  13.5  17.3  17.9  26.9  18.9  19.6  10.3  27.8
18  90-92  Photographic, optical, precision instruments  8.2  4.1  9.3  7.7  2.7  2.2  10.3  7.3  6.2  6.0  15.5  14.0  8.8  4.0
19  93  Arms &munitions  18.8  12.3  12.6  11.1  n.a.  n.a.  28.0  25.9  30.0  30.0  30.0  30.3  11.0  14.9
20  94-96  Miscellaneous articles  15.0  15.3  20.1  19.1  10.3  10.0  21.8  23.0  13.4  13.2  33.9  34.1  27.7  28.9
21  97-98  Objets d'art  0.8  0.0  14.1  8.9  4.4  2.2  30.0  30.0  5.0  5.0  17.1  15.3  6.5  5.5
Total  13.9  14.9  12.3  7.8  6.2  3.6  15.2  10.9  9.6  14.7  23.3  13.7  15.6  19.0
Sources: ASEAN Secretariat, CEPTProduct  Lists 1997/1998; Center for International Economics (1998);  1995 COMTRADE System; Cambodia Customs House (1996)
Note:  Singapore's tariff rates are close to zero although some specific tariffs are collected from such items as automobiles and petroleum oils.Annex  3. The Structure of Vietnam's Liberalization Schedules
Inclusion List  Temporary Exclusion List  Sensitive List  General Exception List
(IL)  (TEL)  (SL)  (GEL)
imports  Exprts  W. Tariff  IrMorts  Exports  W. Tariff  IWorts  Exports  W. Tariff  inports  Exports  W. Tariff
($1.000)  ($1.000)  Rate (%M (5,000)  ($1.000) Rate (%)  ($1.000!  ($1.000)  Rate (%M  ($1.000)  (51.000)  Rate Mg
AGR  28390  256932  5.3  3346  8317  10.5  813  7493  3.9  479  3272  24.8
BMF  129299  27027  6.7  168592  4141  20.8  0  0  na  0  0  10.0
BTP  0  0  na  5135  119  60.0  0  0  na  229658  0  50.0
CLO  5281  11482  48.5  460  207  33.0  0  0  na  0  0  na
COG  16933  211968  11.4  12588  815  14.2  0  0  na  53  0  10.0
CRP  165650  1440  4.4  402818  15688  6.4  0  0  na  418  33  10.7
LMF  7163  1193  9.2  20911  20651  22.3  0  0  na  35  103  4.3
MCE  284620  48377  6.0  209065  8003  24.3  0  0  na  78494  992  6.9
PAG  30313  37919  19.0  139522  275823  26.3  463  0  34.4  14561  0  23.2
PCP  18002  0  1.8  6402  5  1.1  0  0  na  641778  3296  46.1
TEX  32910  1287  6.4  88052  3831  27.2  0  0  na  0  0  na
TRP  25762  2203  25.8  28797  1098  30.1  0  0  na  126730  67  33.8
744322  599828  7.3  1085687  338698  17.5  1275.969  7493  15.0  1092205  7763  42.3
Share (%)  25.5  62.9  37.1  35.5  0.04  0.8  37.4  0.8
Sources: ASEAN Secretariat, CEPTProducts Lists (1997/1998); Center for International Economics (1998); 1996 Trains Database,Annex  4. GTAP 4 Aggregation  Strategy
REGIONS
1. Indonesia (IDN)  18. minerals, n.e.c.
2. Malaysia (MYS)
3. The Philippines (PHL)  5. PCP (Petroleum and coal products)
4. Singapore (SGP)  32. petroleum & coal products
5. Thailand (THA)
6. Vietnam (VNM)  6. TEX (Textiles)
7. Japan(JPN)  27. textiles
8. EU15 (EU15)
9. United States (USA)  7. CLO(Apparel)
10. Hong-Kong, Korea (NIEs)  28. apparel
11. China (CHN)
12. ROW (ROW)  8. LMF(Light manufacturing)
29. leather products
SECTORS  30. wood products
1. AGR(Agriculture and forestry)  42. manufactures n.e.c.
1. paddy rice
2. wheat  9. BMF(Basic manufacturing)
3. cereal grains  31. paper products, publishing
4. vegetables, fruits, nuts  34. mineral products
5. oil seeds  35. ferrous metals
6. sugar cane  36. metal n.e.c.
7. plant based fibers  37. metal products
8. crops n.e.c.
9. bovine cattle, sheep, goat, etc  10.  CRP  (Chemical,  rubber,  plastic
10. animal products  products)
12. wool, silk-worm, cocoons  33. chemical, rubber, plastic products
13. forestry
14. fishing  11. TRP (Transport Equipment)
38. motor vehicles & parts
2. PAG(Processed agriculture)  39. transport equipment n.e.c.
19. bovine, cattle etc meat
20. meat products  12. MCE (Electronics and Machinery)
21. vegetable oils & fats  40. electronic equipment
22. daily products  41. machinery & equipment
23. processed rice
24. sugar  13. OTH (Others)
25. food products n.e.c.  43. electricity
44. gas manufacture, distribution
3. BTP (Beverage and tobacco products)  45. water
26. beverages & tobacco products  46. construction
47. trade, transport
4. COG (Coal, oil, gas)  48. financial business, recreational services
15. coal  49.  pubic  administration  and  defense,
16. oil  education, health services
17. gas  50. dwellings
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IDN  MYS  PHL  SGP  THA  NIES  EU15  USA  CHI  JPN
SCENARIO  1  (AFT'A 1)
AGR  10(13)  1(2)  0.3(170)  7(23)  25(3)  2(1)  8(0.8)  15(1)  19(1)  1(1)
PAG  6(102)  114(55)  8(65)  53(36)  105(77)  12(-23)  73(-23)  8(-23)  12(-23)  6(-23)
BTP  7(97)  1(4)  2(4)  325(-0.2)  5(365)  30(4)  15(4)  1(-3)  115(-4)  0.05(0)
COG  3(1)  1(12)  1(67)  7(-3)  32(65)  0.3(-4)  21(-5)  0.5(4)  3(-5)  0.6(-5)
PCP  0  10(3)  8(0)  395(-0.3)  19(0.2)  0  4(0)  0.8(0)  10(0)  29(0)
TEX  53(106)  57(18)  2(125)  79(156)  73(153)  343(-9)  38(-9)  6(-9)  78(-9)  107(-9)
CLO  30(944)  6(468)  1(1017)  14(1074)  8(921)  3(-55)  0.4(-54)  0.1(-54)  7(-55)  3(-55)
LMF  9(-5)  14(36)  1(304)  80(120)  28(134)  79(-22)  15(-22)  5(-22)  17(-22)  17(-22)
BMF  74(60)  49(60)  1(14)  191(45)  115(52)  186(-15)  72(-15)  19(-15)  161(-15)  97(-15)
CRP  192(2)  49(14)  99(2)  262(1l9)  93(17)  184(-7)  200(-7)  51(-7)  156(-7)  107(-7)
TRP  38(-12)  4(27)  17(968)  70(10';)  174(56)  116(-15)  85(-15)  90(-15)  19(-15)  265(-15)
MCE  6(26)  113(99)  3(2)  578(3'i)  110(89)  254(-16)  362(-16)  89(-16)  173(-16)  322(-16)
OTH  3(0.3)  3(0.3)  4(0.2)  2(0)  4(0)  133(0.3)  13(0.2)  3(0.3)  4(0.2)  2(0.5)
Total  431(26)  420(50)  147(19)  2061(24)  791(60)  1343(-12)  906(-13)  287(-13)  774(-12)  959(-14)
SCENARIO 2  (AFTA  2)
AGR  10(16)  1(7)  0.3(180)  7(26)  26(7)  2(4)  8(4)  16(4)  20(4)  1(4)
PAG  6(108)  117(60)  9(70)  55(41)  108(82)  13(-21)  75(-21)  8(-21)  12(-21)  6(-21)
BTP  7(99)  0.5(-2)  2(-3)  328(1)  5(370)  30(-3)  15(-3)  1(-3)  116(-3)  0.1(0)
COG  3(1)  0.6(12)  1(67)  7(-3)  32(65)  0.3(4)  21(4)  0.5(-4)  3(4)  0.6(-5)
PCP  0.0  10(3)  8(0.1)  395(-0.1)  19(0.4)  0.0  4(0)  0.8(0)  10(0.1)  29(0.1)
TEX  52(102)  56(16)  2(121)  77(151)  71(148)  336(-10)  38(-10)  6(-10)  76(-10)  105(-10)
CLO  30(945)  6(468)  1(1017)  14(1075)  8(921)  3(-55)  0.4(-54)  0.1(-54)  7(-55)  3(-55)
LMF  9(4)  15(37)  1(309)  80(122)  29(136)  80(-21)  15(-21)  5(-21)  17(-21)  18(-21)
BMF  75(61)  49(61)  1(14)  192(46)  116(53)  188(-15)  73(-15)  19(-15)  162(-15)  98(-15)
CRP  193(2)  48(15)  99(2)  263(19)  93(17)  184(-7)  200(-7)  51(-7)  157(-7)  107(-7)
TRP  38(-12)  4(27)  18(978)  70(106)  175(57)  117(-15)  85(-15)  90(-15)  19(-15)  267(-15)
MCE  6(27)  113(99)  3(3)  579(35)  110(89)  254(-15)  363(-15)  88(-15)  174(-15)  323(-15)
OTH  4(1)  3(1)  4(2)  2(1)  4(1)  134(1)  13(1)  3(1)  4(1)  2(1)
Total  432(26)  423(51)  148(20)  2069(25)  795(61)  1341(-12)  910(-13)  289(-13)  777(-12)  960(-14)
SCENARIO 3 (AFTA 3)
AGR  9(13)  1(7)  0.3(200)  8(29)  26(5)  2(3)  8(2)  16(2)  19(2)  1(-3)
PAG  7(130)  111(52)  20(294)  58(48)  104(75)  12(-25)  71(-26)  7(-26)  11(-26)  6(-26)
BTP  8(130)  1(92)  4(108)  662(103)  3(145)  6(-80)  3(-80)  0.2(-79)  24(-80)  0
COG  3(-1)  1(15)  1(59)  9(31)  32(64)  0.2(-23)  21(-6)  0.5(0)  3(-6)  0.6(-5)
PCP  0  5(-47)  10(22)  441(12)  22(16)  0  1(-70)  0.3(-63)  3(-70)  9(-69)
TEX  52(102?)  56(17)  2(124)  76(145)  72(151)  340(-10)  38(-10)  6(-9)  77(-10)  106(-10)
CLO  30(935)  6(456)  1(1067)  13(1055)  8(940)  3(-54)  0.4(-47)  0.1(-58)  7(-54)  3(-54)
LMF  9(-10)  14(29)  1(291)  91(15'1)  27(126)  77(-24)  14(-25)  5(-24)  16(-24)  17(-24)
BMF  72(54)  47(53)  1(14)  183(39)  113(49)  182(-17)  71(-17)  18(-17)  157(-17)  96(-17)
CRP  190(1)  48(14)  100(3)  257(16)  93(17)  184(-7)  199(-7)  51(-7)  156(-7)  107(-7)
TRP  190(339)  6(103)  6(264)  76(123)  517(364)  38(-72)  28(-72)  29(-72)  6(-72)  87(-72)
MCE  6(29)  113(100)  3(3)  585(36)  110(89)  252(-16)  358(-16)  87(-16)  172(-16)  320(-16)
OTH  3(-3)  3(4)  4(-1)  2(-1)  4(-2)  132(-1)  13(-1)  3(0.3)  4(-1)  2(-1)
Total  579(69)  412(47)  152(23)  2461(48)  1130(129)  1226(-19)  825(-21)  224(-32)  656(-25)  754(-32)
SCENARIO 4 (UNELATERAL)
AGR  9(5)  1(-3)  0.3(200)  7(19"  24(-3)  2(-3)  8(6)  26(70)  36(87)  1(6)
PAG  6(110)  101(38)  18(257)  53(35)  95(59)  29(84)  96(0.1)  14(47)  15(2)  7(-10)
BTP  6(63)  1(35)  3(49)  469(44)  2(70)  46(48)  24(51)  1(47)  177(48)  0.1(100)
COG  3(-1)  0.6(15)  1(59)  9(30';  32(63)  0.3(15)  21(-6)  0.5(0)  3(-3)  0.6(-5)
PCP  0  5(-51)  9(13)  409(3)  20(7)  0  2(-33)  0.8(-1)  4(-61)  31(8)
TEX  33(27)  35(-27)  1(45)  48(54)  45(58)  580(55)  73(73)  5(-30)  124(46)  211(80)
CLO  10(232)  2(82)  0.2(233)  4(271)  3(233)  25(264)  3(281)  1(317)  53(241)  26(245)
LMF  6(-33)  10(-5)  0.7(204)  67(86)  20(67)  100(-1)  29(54)  8(36)  35(64)  20(-9)
BMF  54(17)  35(16)  0.7(-21)  138(5)  86(13)  248(13)  90(6)  23(5)  224(18)  110(-5)
CRP  176(-7)  44(5)  92(-5)  239(8)  86(8)  214(8)  218(2)  52(4)  166(-1)  112(-3)
TRP  78(79)  3(-18)  2(48)  31(-9)  211(89)  150(9)  21(-79)  97(-9)  13(44)  381(22)
MCE  5(10)  97(71)  3(-11)  503(17)  95(62)  313(4)  365(-15)  94(-10)  224(9)  350(-8)
OTH  4(3)  3(2)  4(4)  2(-0.-)  4(4)  138(4)  14(4)  4(3)  4(4)  2(3)
Total  388(14)  338(20)  135(10)  1978(19)  721(46)  1844(21)  963(-8)  327(-1)  1078(23)  1251(13)Annex 5.B. Changes in Vietnam's Exports by Source
IDN  MYS  PHL  SGP  THA  NIES  EU15  USA  CHI  JPN
SCENARIO 1 (AFTA 1)
AGR  99(98)  52(-0.3)  10(160)  189(-2)  22(3)  165(-2)  298(-3)  153(-3)  40(-3)  74(-3)
PAG  87(0.4)  95(0.4)  33(1)  34(0.3)  53(334)  44(0.2)  49(0.2)  23(0.2)  162(0.2)  371(0.2)
BTP  0  0  0  0.3(4)  0  2(3)  0.1(0)  0.4(5)  0.6(2)  1(3)
COG  19(0.2)  2(0)  3(16)  194(0.2)  12(61)  14(0.1)  56(0.1)  2(0)  121(0.1)  724(0.1)
PCP  0  0  0  0  0  0  0.3(4)  0  0.8(3)  0
TEX  -34  2(37)  2(78)  2(4)  0.4(192)  51(4)  22(4)  0.1(0)  1(4)  67(4)
CLO  0  2(86)  0  13(14)  0.2(1000)  31(14)  453(14)  22(14)  0.5(14)  443(14)
LMF  0.1(29)  13(71)  1(244)  12(5)  29(344)  40(5)  721(5)  7(5)  15(5)  158(5)
BMF  1(12)  17(3)  0.8(153)  10(2)  3(39)  9(2)  45(2)  2f2)  3(2)  8(2)
CRP  3(43)  2(29)  2(68)  14(2)  1(119)  4(2)  16(2)  2(2)  7(2)  5(2)
TRP  0  0.3(88)  1(119)  2(10)  1(116)  8(10)  6(10)  0  3(10)  0.2(12)
MCE  2(5)  5(25)  2(5)  29(5)  1(42)  22(5)  11(5)  0  1(5)  8(5)
OTH  38(-0.6)  5(-0.6)  19(-0.6)  7(-0.5)  22(-0.5)  114(-0.7)  381(-0.7)  129(-0.7)  19(-0.7)  386(-0.6)
Total  252(25)  196(5)  75(17)  507(0)  145(97)  504(1)  2057(4)  341(-0.6)  373(0.2)  2244(3)
SCENARIO 2 (AFrA  2)
AGR  96(91)  51(-3)  9(150)  183(-6)  21(-0.5)  160(-5)  287(-6)  148(-6)  39(-6)  71(-6)
PAG  85(-2)  191(103)  164(397)  33(-2)  52(323)  43(-2)  47(-2)  23(-2)  158(-2)  362(-2)
BTP  0  0  0  0.3(0)  0  2(0)  0.1(0)  0.4(0)  0.6(0)  1(0)
COG  19(0)  1(0)  3(15)  193(-0.1)  12(61)  14(-0.1)  56(-0.2)  2(-0.6)  120(-0.2)  722(-0.2)
PCP  0  0  0  0  0  0  0.3(4)  0  0.8(3)  0
TEX  1(32)  2(35)  2(76)  2(3)  0.4(192)  50(2)  21(2)  0.1(0)  1(3)  66(2)
CLO  0  2(81)  0  13(11)  0.2(950)  30(11)  440(11)  21(11)  0.5(11)  431(10)
LMF  0.1(29)  13(67)  1(235)  12(3)  28(333)  39(2)  703(2)  7(3)  15(2)  154(3)
BMF  1(9)  17(0.5)  0.8(147)  10(-0.4)  3(37)  9(-0.7)  44(-0.6)  2(-0.6)  3(-0.7)  7(-0.5)
CRP  3(42)  2(27)  2(67)  14(1)  1(118)  4(1)  16(1)  2(1)  7(1)  4(1)
TRP  0  0.3(82)  1(111)  2(6)  1(107)  8(6)  6(6)  0  3(6)  0.3(8)
MCE  2(3)  4(23)  2(3)  29(3)  1(39)  22(3)  11(2)  0.1(0)  0.6(3)  8(3)
OTH  37(-2)  5(-2)  19(-3)  8(-2)  21(-2)  111(-2)  374(-2)  127(-2)  18(-3)  379(-2)
Total  246(22)  290(56)  205(218)  498(-2)  142(92)  492(-1)  2005(2)  331(-3)  367(-2)  2206(1)
SCENARIO 3 (AFTA 3)
AGR  98(94)  52(-1)  9(154)  186(-4)  22(2)  162(-4)  292(-5)  150(-5)  40(-5)  72(-5)
PAG  87(0.5)  196(108)  168(408)  34(2)  53(334)  44(0.3)  49(0.3)  23(0.3)  162(0.2)  372(0.3)
BTP  0  0  0  0.3(4)  0  2(4)  0.1(0)  0.4(5)  0.6(4)  1(4)
COG  19(2)  2(2)  4(18)  198(2)  12(64)  15(2)  57(2)  2(2)  123(2)  738(2)
PCP  0  0  0  0  0  0  0.3(8)  0  0.8(5)  0
TEX  1(33)  2(37)  2(79)  2(4)  0.4(192)  51(4)  22(4)  0.1(0)  1(4)  67(4)
CLO  0  2(83)  0  13(12)  0.2(1000)  30(11)  444(12)  21(12)  0.5(12)  434(11)
LMF  0.1(43)  13(70)  1(247)  12(5)  29(342)  39(4)  716(4)  7(5)  15(4)  157(4)
BMF  1(14)  17(5)  0.8(156)  10(4)  3(42)  9(3)  46(3)  2(3)  3(3)  8(3)
CRP  3(44)  2(29)  2(70)  14(3)  1(121)  4(3)  16(3)  2(3)  7(3)  5(3)
TRP  0.1(25)  0.4(106)  2(142)  2(22)  1(141)  9(22)  7(22)  0  4(22)  0.3(24)
MCE  2(9)  5(28)  2(7)  30(7)  1(78)  23(7)  11(7)  0.1(17)  0.6(7)  9(7)
OTH  39(2)  5(1)  19(1)  8(2)  22(2)  116(1)  389(1)  132(1)  19(1)  394(1)
Total  251(25)  297(59)  210(226)  509(0.4)  146(98)  504(1)  2048(4)  340(-0.8)  376(0.8)  2256(3)
SCENARIO 4 (UNILATERAL)
AGR  93(85)  49(-6)  9(142)  177(-9)  21(-3)  155(-8)  277(-10)  142(-10)  37(-9)  69(-10)
PAG  83(-4)  187(99)  160(386)  32(-4)  50(312)  42(-5)  46(-5)  22(-5)  154(-4)  353(-5)
BTP  0  0  0  0.3(0)  0  2(0)  0.1(0)  0.4(0)  0.6(-2)  1(0)
COG  19(2)  2(1)  3(17)  197(2)  12(64)  15(1)  57(2)  2(2)  123(2)  735(2)
PCP  0  0  0  0  0  0  0.3(8)  0  0.8(6)  0
TEX  2(56)  3(60)  3(109)  2(22)  0.4(242)  60(22)  25(22)  0.1(17)  1(22)  78(22)
CLO  0  4(203)  0  22(85)  0.4(1650)  50(86)  738(85)  36(86)  0.8(86)  716(83)
LMF  0.1(71)  15(96)  1(297)  14(20)  33(407)  45(20)  825(20)  8(20)  17(20)  180(20)
BMF  1(8)  16(-0.2)  1(147)  10(-1)  3(36)  9(-1)  44(-1)  2(-2)  3(-1)  7(-1)
CRP  3(44)  2(29)  2(69)  14(3)  1(121)  4(3)  16(3)  2(3)  7(3)  5(3)
TRP  0.1(25)  0.4(124)  2(159)  3(31)  1(157)  10(31)  7(31)  0  4(31)  0.3(32)
MCE  2(10)  5(29)  2(9)  30(8)  1(80)  23(8)  11(8)  0.1(17)  0.7(8)  9(8)
OTH  36(-6)  5(-6)  18(-6)  7(-6)  21(-6)  108(-6)  361(-6)  122(-6)  18(-6)  366(-6)
Total  240(19)  288(55)  201(213)  508(0.1)  145(96)  522(5)  2408(22)  337(-2)  368(-1)  2519(15)Policy  Research Working  Paper  Series
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